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Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action 
Waivers Teach Us about Law-making 
Rhonda Wasserman* 
The Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion advanced an agenda found in neither the text nor the 
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Concepcion provoked 
a maelstrom of reactions not only from the press and the academy, but 
also from Congress, federal agencies, and lower courts, as they 
struggled to interpret, apply, reverse, or cabin the Court’s blockbuster 
decision.  These reactions raise a host of provocative questions about 
the relationships among the branches of government and between the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts.  Among other questions, 
Concepcion and its aftermath force us to grapple with the relationship 
between law and politics, the role of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation, the meaning of legislative primacy, the influence of 
federal agencies on the development of the law, and competing 
conceptions of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  I would like to thank Ian 
Everhart and Nikolay Markov for diligent research assistance and perennial good cheer.  I am 
grateful to the editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for inviting me to 
participate in the “Future of Class Actions and Its Alternatives” symposium, at which I presented 
this Article, and to the symposium participants for their constructive feedback.  Finally, I dedicate 
this Article with much love to my parents, Deborah and Marvin Wasserman, on the occasion of 
their sixtieth wedding anniversary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many years, I taught a course called Legal Process, in which first-
year law students explored the roles played by Congress, the Supreme 
Court, the President, administrative agencies, and state governments in 
the law-making process.  Among other topics, we discussed federalism 
and the allocation of law-making authority between state and national 
governments; institutional competency and the unique skills that each 
branch of government brings to the law-making process; the role of 
legislative history in statutory interpretation; and the deference that 
courts owe to administrative agency interpretations of legislation within 
their regulatory authority. 
It is not much of an exaggeration to say that one could structure an 
entire Legal Process course around class action waivers: contractual 
provisions embedded in pre-dispute arbitration agreements by which a 
consumer, employee or other party waives the right to present her claim 
together with others (in a Rule 23 class action, a collective action under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act or some other form of representative 
action).  Such a course could begin with an examination of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA” or “Act”)1 and its legislative history, and then 
present different theories of statutory interpretation.  The students could 
then read the Supreme Court’s blockbuster decision in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion,2 which invoked a “breathtakingly broad view of 
implied preemption”3 to conclude that the FAA preempts state 
unconscionability law upon which lower courts had relied to invalidate 
class action waivers.4  After examining the majority, concurring and 
dissenting opinions, the students could debate whether the legal model 
or the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making best explains the 
result in Concepcion.5  Finally, the course could present the reactions of 
Congress, the federal agencies and the lower courts, as they have sought 
to interpret, apply, reverse and cabin Concepcion.  The students could 
then debate a host of issues that these reactions raise.  This Article will 
present just three of the fascinating questions about law-making raised 
by Concepcion and the governmental responses it provoked. 
Part I will sketch the competing efforts by Congress and the Supreme 
Court to regulate arbitration and collective action in the arbitration 
 
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
2. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
3. Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5. 
4. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
5. See infra notes 303–16 and accompanying text (discussing the attitudinal model, legal 
model, and principal-agent model of Supreme Court decision-making). 
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context.  While the conventional model vests ultimate lawmaking 
authority in Congress, the actual relationship between Congress and the 
Court is more complicated where, as here, the Court disregards 
legislative intent in interpreting the law and Congress lacks the political 
will to correct the mistake. 
Next, Part II will examine the efforts by federal agencies to preserve 
a right to participate in a class action notwithstanding Concepcion, and 
the dilemma these agency actions present for the Court.  Must the 
Supreme Court accord Chevron deference to agency rulings and rules 
that seek to preserve a right to collective action, or may the Court strike 
down agency actions that it deems inconsistent with the FAA, as 
interpreted by the Court itself? 
Finally, Part III will present several lower court decisions rendered 
after Concepcion and suggest that they challenge the traditional view 
that the Supreme Court announces the law and the lower courts 
obediently follow its precedents. 
I. CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT 
In my Legal Process course, we began with the basic proposition that 
Congress has primary authority to craft social policy for the nation and 
to make law,6 while the Supreme Court has primary authority to 
interpret the law when adjudicating cases.7  But we then examined the 
tension in the dynamic relationship between Congress and the Court, as 
the Court decides whether to credit or ignore legislative history in the 
interpretative process and as Congress considers whether to legislatively 
overrule judicial decisions that interpret the law in a manner with which 
Congress disagrees.  This tension between Congress and the Court has 
been acute as they have grappled with the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements in general and class action waivers in particular. 
A. Congress Makes Law: The Federal Arbitration Act 
Before Congress acted in 1925, a party could sign a pre-dispute 
 
6. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331, 333 (“For all its shortcomings, Congress remains the legitimate source of national 
policy.”); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of 
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 201 (1989) (“One of the central premises of the 
Constitution’s division of powers, and the American system of government, is that primary 
federal lawmaking authority belongs to Congress.”). 
7. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation 
of Powers, and the Line between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1999) (distinguishing between “a legislature’s power to enact laws and a 
court’s authority to interpret them”); see also id. at 1089 (“[M]ajoritarian institutions enact rules 
that apply generally to society, while courts apply those rules to individual litigants.”). 
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arbitration agreement but then decline to honor it once a dispute arose.8  
Because courts declined to specifically enforce arbitration agreements,9 
parties had to litigate their disputes notwithstanding arbitration clauses.  
Concerned even then about court congestion and the costs of 
litigation,10 Congress passed, and President Coolidge signed, the United 
States Arbitration Act,11 as the FAA was then known, to empower 
courts to specifically enforce written arbitration agreements.  The law 
took effect on January 1, 1926.12  Its drafters perceived the Act to be 
procedural in nature, making the remedy of specific performance 
available, but leaving the substantive law governing the parties’ 
contractual rights unaffected.13  Modeled after statutes enacted in New 
Jersey and New York,14 the FAA declared written arbitration clauses in 
commercial contracts to “be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”15  The 
goal “was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other 
contracts, but not more so.”16  To retain this parity, section two of the 
Act authorized courts to invalidate arbitration agreements “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
 
8. See, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 
VA. L. REV. 265, 265, 276–77, 284 (1926) (stating that without this statute, arbitration 
agreements would not be recognized and enforced by federal courts). 
9. Id. at 276–77, 284.  See also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: J. Hearings on 
S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14 
(1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Gen. Counsel for the N.Y. 
State Chamber of Commerce); S. REP. NO. 68–536, at 2 (1924) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; 
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 20 (1992); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory 
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by 
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101, 104 (2006) (citing, inter alia, WESLEY A. STURGES, A 
TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS 239–40 (1930)). 
10. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 265, 269.  See also Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 6–7 
(statement of Charles L. Bernheimer); id. at 21 (letter from Herbert Hoover); id. at 26 (statement 
of Alexander Rose); id. at 34–35 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen); Sales and Contracts to 
Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 
4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 & 5 (1923) 
(statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) [hereinafter 1923 Senate Hearing]; SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 9, at 3. 
11. U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (1947)). 
12. 9 U.S.C. § 15.  The law was codified and enacted into positive law in 1947.  Act of July 
30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669. 
13. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]; Joint Hearings, supra note 
9, at 37–38 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen). 
14. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 266 nn.3–4, 269 (citing 1923 N.J. Laws 291 and 1920 
N.Y. Laws 803). 
15. U.S. Arbitration Act § 2, 43 Stat. at 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
16. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).  See also 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 1 (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing 
as other contracts . . . .”). 
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contract,”17 including fraud, duress or unconscionability.18 
Congress intended the Act to govern arbitration agreements between 
merchants; that is, “parties presumed to be of approximately equal 
bargaining strength . . . .”19  According to Julius Henry Cohen, general 
counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce and principal 
drafter of the Act,20 arbitration was 
peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between 
merchants as to questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, 
compliance with terms of payment, excuses for non-performance, and 
the like.  It has a place also in the determination of the simpler 
questions of law—the questions of law which arise out of these daily 
relations between merchants as to the passage of title, the existence of 
warranties, or the questions of law which are complementary to the 
questions of fact which we have just mentioned.21 
When Charles L. Bernheimer, Chair of the Committee on Arbitration of 
the New York State Chamber of Commerce, testified before Congress 
in favor of the Act, he too advocated arbitration as a means to reduce 
the high litigation costs incurred by “merchants” or others “engaged in 
business” who encounter “trade disputes.”22  The legislative history 
makes clear that the Act was not intended to govern employment 
contracts.23  Congressional power under the Commerce Clause was 
“then thought to be far narrower than we have subsequently come to see 
it,”24 and Supreme Court case law at the time restricted it to those 
“employment relationships “in which workers were actually engaged in 
 
17. U.S. Arbitration Act § 2, 43 Stat. at 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
18. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (stating that 
generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be 
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements). 
19. Moses, supra note 9, at 106; accord Amalia D. Kessler, Stuck in Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2012, at A27 (“[T]he arbitration act was initially envisioned as applying primarily to 
disputes between commercial equals . . . .”). 
20. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (“Mr. Cohen . . . has had 
charge of the actual drafting of the work.”); Moses, supra note 9, at 102. 
21. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 281. 
22. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 6–7 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer); see also id. at 
12 (statement of R.S. French) (noting that the bill advances the interests of “large exporters and 
importers”); 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 3 (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) 
(advocating arbitration for the “disposition of all business disputes”). 
23. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 126 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the legislative history “contain[s] [no] evidence that the proponents of the legislation 
intended it to apply to agreements affecting employment”); id. at 128 (“[N]o one interested in the 
enactment of the FAA ever intended or expected that § 2 would apply to employment 
contracts.”); id. at 129 (concluding that the Act “was not intended to apply to employment 
contracts at all”). 
24. Id. at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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interstate commerce.”25  While most workers were therefore believed to 
be beyond congressional reach and their contracts beyond the scope of 
the proposed legislation, seamen and railroad workers worked in 
interstate or foreign commerce.  Representatives of the Seamen’s Union 
expressed concern that employers would exploit their superior 
bargaining power to place arbitration clauses in collective bargaining 
agreements with seamen and the proposed law would require courts to 
enforce them.26 
During the 1923 Senate hearing, W.H.H. Piatt, the chair of the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) Committee that drafted the bill, 
acknowledged the union’s concern that the law would compel 
arbitration of disputes between stevedores and their employers.27  Mr. 
Piatt made clear, however, that 
[i]t is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, 
at all.  It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the 
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their 
damages are, if they want to do it.28 
To address the union’s concern, Mr. Piatt proposed adding language to 
clarify that the law would not “apply to seamen or any class of workers 
in interstate or foreign commerce.”29  Then-Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover submitted a letter to Senator Thomas Sterling, who 
chaired the subcommittee holding the hearing, proposing similar 
language.30  SB 1005, a revised bill introduced during the next session 
of Congress in 1924, expressly stated that “nothing herein contained 
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, 
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce.”31  Congress passed the law with that language intact,32 
 
25. Id. at 136.  See also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal 
child labor law and holding that Congress’s Commerce power did not extend to employees 
working intrastate to produce goods shipped interstate), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941). 
26. See Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual Convention of the International Seaman’s 
Union of America 203–04 (1923) (statement of the president of the International Seaman’s Union 
of America) (contending that “[t]he personal hunger of the seaman, and the hunger of the wife 
and children of the railroad man will surely tempt them to sign” such agreements), quoted in 
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
27. 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
28. Id. (emphasis added). 
29. Id. 
30. See id. at 14 (letter from Herbert Hoover) (proposing language to exclude employment 
contracts of “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate or 
foreign commerce”). 
31. S. 1005, 68th Cong. § 1 (1924), quoted in Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 2.  See also 
Donna Meredith Matthews, Employment Law after Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory 
Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 368 (1997) (“[T]his exclusion 
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explicitly exempting from the Act’s scope all employees then subject to 
federal power under the Commerce Clause and assuming that all other 
employees were beyond the law’s scope. 
Just as the legislative history reveals congressional intent to exclude 
employment agreements from the Act’s purview, so too does it reveal a 
concern for voluntariness and an intent to exclude contracts of adhesion, 
otherwise known as “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts.  Senator Thomas 
Walsh of Montana, a member of the Senate Subcommittee, expressed 
concern during the 1923 Senate Hearing about contracts of adhesion, 
identifying a variety of contracts “that are . . . really not voluntar[y],”33 
including insurance policies, shipping contracts, and building 
contracts.34  W.H.H. Piatt shared this concern, stating, “Speaking for 
myself, personally, I would say I would not favor any kind of legislation 
that would permit . . . forcing a man to sign that kind of a contract.”35  
He went on to concede that contracts of adhesion “ought to be protested 
against, because it is the primary end of this contract [sic] that it is a 
contract between merchants one with another . . . .”36  In other words, 
the point of the statute was to enforce arbitration agreements between 
merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, not arbitration clauses in 
contracts of adhesion. 
Senator Thomas Sterling of South Dakota, Chair of the Senate 
Committee, reiterated concern regarding contracts of adhesion during 
the 1924 Joint Hearings.  He posited that a railroad might include an 
arbitration clause in a shipping contract and then tell the shipper, “‘You 
can take it or leave it, just as you please; but unless you sign you can not 
ship.’”37  Julius Cohen, the principal drafter of the bill, dismissed the 
concern.38  Seeking to assuage the Senator’s concern, Cohen cited the 
 
clause was intended to assuage concerns by the very employees who might be affected—those 
engag[ing] in interstate commerce.  Because the Commerce Clause did not reach other 
employment contracts, they were unaffected by the FAA.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering 
the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the 
Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 294 (“The evidence suggests . . 
. that the 1925 Congress would have considered all workers subject to the commerce power as 
within the employment exception.”). 
32. See U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 1, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925) (containing the 
exception for seamen and workers in interstate commerce). 
33. 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 9 (colloquy by Sen. Walsh during statement of 
W.H.H. Piatt). 
34. Id. at 9–11 (colloquy by Sen. Walsh during statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
35. Id. at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
36. Id. 
37. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Sen. Thomas Sterling). 
38. Id. (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (“There is nothing to that contention . . . .”). 
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Bills of Lading Act,39 which he claimed protected shippers by 
prescribing the terms of a bill of lading.  More generally, he suggested 
that government regulations protect people “to-day as never before.”40 
[W]e have the regulation of the Federal Government, through its 
regularly constituted bodies, and they protect everybody.  Railroad 
contracts and express contracts and insurance contracts are provided 
for.  You can not get a provision into an insurance contract to-day 
unless it is approved by the insurance department.41 
In other words, the Act was not intended to validate arbitration clauses 
in contracts of adhesion, but rather to render enforceable voluntary 
arbitration agreements between merchants.42  Cohen emphasized this 
focus on voluntary agreements in a law review article he co-wrote 
immediately after the law went into effect: “No one is required to make 
an agreement to arbitrate.  Such action by a party is entirely 
voluntary.”43 
The FAA is silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration, and for good 
reason.  When Congress passed the Act in 1925, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure had not yet been promulgated and class action litigation 
for damages was virtually unknown.44  Thus, Congress gave no 
apparent thought to the right of a group of similarly situated parties to 
proceed collectively in arbitration or the enforceability of class action 
waivers at the time it enacted the FAA.45  There is no support 
whatsoever in the legislative history for the proposition that Congress 
intended the Act to displace state laws seeking to preserve the right of 
consumers and others to proceed collectively. 
B. The Court Interprets the Law 
In the near-century since Congress enacted the FAA, the Supreme 
Court through its interpretation of the Act has advanced its own agenda, 
disregarding legislative history and congressional intent.  Individual 
Justices have openly bemoaned this development.  In 1995, for 
 
39. Billing of Lading Act, ch. 415, 39 Stat. 538 (1916) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 
80101–80116 (1994)). 
40. Joint Hearings, supra note 9, at 15 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen). 
41. Id. 
42. Moses, supra note 9, at 107.  See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
20, 42 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt that any 
legislator who voted for it expected it to apply to . . . form contracts between parties of unequal 
bargaining power . . . .”). 
43. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 8, at 279. 
44. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
45. Id. 
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example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted: “[T]he Court has 
abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect 
to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own 
creation.”46  Even earlier, Justice John Paul Stevens commented that the 
Court has done more than “put its own imprint” on the FAA: 
[W]hen its refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text enables it to 
disregard countervailing considerations that were expressed by 
Members of the enacting Congress and that remain valid today, the 
Court misuses its authority . . . .  When the Court simply ignores the 
interest of the unrepresented employee, it skews its interpretation with 
its own policy preferences.47 
Even prior to Concepcion, the Court’s arbitration decisions were 
replete with examples of judicial interpretation divorced from 
congressional intent.  In 2001, for example, the Court rejected the 
contention that the Act should be limited to commercial deals or 
merchant’s sales,48 even though the chair of the ABA committee that 
drafted the bill stated that its “primary end” was “a contract between 
merchants one with another.”49  The Court upheld the enforceability of 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts50 notwithstanding the Act’s 
express exclusion of contracts of those working in foreign or interstate 
commerce (the only employment contracts believed to be within 
congressional control in 1925).51  And the Court enforced arbitration 
clauses in a variety of circumstances in which the parties had unequal 
 
46. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
47. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132–33 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
see id. at 132 (stating that “the Court’s interpretation of the Act has given it a scope far beyond 
the expectations of the Congress that enacted it”).  See also Moses, supra note 9, at 99–100 
(noting that the FAA as interpreted by the Court today “would not likely have commanded a 
single vote in the 1925 Congress”); Carrington & Haagen, supra note 6, at 402 (“[I]f the FAA 
had been presented to Congress, as legislation having the effects ascribed to [it] by the Court . . . 
[it would not] have been assured of a single vote of approval.”). 
48. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Craft v. 
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1999), which read the phrase “transaction 
involving commerce” in section two of the Act to connote “a commercial deal or merchant’s 
sale”). 
49. 1923 Senate Hearing, supra note 10, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
50. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 (interpreting the FAA to govern all employment 
contracts except those of transportation workers, which are explicitly exempted by section one of 
the Act); cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23, 25 n.2 (1991) (holding that 
a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act “can be subjected to compulsory 
arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration application” that 
plaintiff was required to submit as a condition of employment, while disclaiming that the 
application constituted an employment contract). 
51. See supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 
FAA). 
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bargaining power.52  In the Court’s view, “[m]ere inequality in 
bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration 
agreements are [not] enforceable . . . .”53  While the Act explicitly 
declines to require enforcement where “‘such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract,’”54 and while the Court 
initially cautioned the lower courts to “‘remain attuned to well-
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from . . . fraud 
or overwhelming economic power,’”55 it has dismissed claims of 
workers and consumers who maintained that they had little choice but to 
accept an arbitration clause buried in a form contract in the absence of 
proof of fraud or coercion.56 
In just the last two years, the Court has continued to substitute its 
policy preferences for Congress’s, reading into the FAA its current 
skepticism about class actions and collective litigation, notwithstanding 
a complete dearth of evidence that Congress intended to mandate 
enforcement of class action waivers.  Although the Court has interpreted 
the Act quite a few times in the last two years,57 two decisions 
 
52. See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32–33 (rejecting plaintiff’s concern about unequal 
bargaining power in the employment context); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478, 484 (1989) (upholding the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a 
“standard” brokerage agreement, which the customer suggested “was adhesive in nature,” as 
applied to Securities Act claims); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 
(1987) (upholding the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a brokerage agreement as applied 
to Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims, notwithstanding the customers’ general concern for 
“broker overreaching”). 
53. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.  See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 
(1995) (upholding the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a contract for termite removal 
between an international company and a homeowner). 
54. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
55. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 
(1985)). 
56. See supra notes 50 and 52 and accompanying text (discussing case law upholding 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts). 
57. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (per 
curiam) (holding that a state’s “prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-
injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration 
of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA” and 
is therefore preempted); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012) (holding 
that when a federal statute “is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable 
forum, the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms”); KPMG 
LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 26 (2011) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a complaint contains both 
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the Act requires courts to ‘compel arbitration of pendent 
arbitrable claims . . . even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of 
separate proceedings in different forums.’” (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 217 (1985))); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the 
FAA preempts a state rule that class action waivers in contracts of adhesion are unconscionable); 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (holding that when a contract vests 
an arbitrator with exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the enforceability of the 
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addressing class-wide arbitration are particularly noteworthy: Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion. 
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. 
Stolt-Nielsen involved a dispute between shipping companies and 
their customers.58  Following a criminal investigation by the 
government that revealed the shipping companies were engaged in 
illegal price-fixing, numerous charterers filed lawsuits against the 
companies.  One of these charterers, AnimalFeeds, filed a putative class 
action in federal court against the shipping company, Stolt-Nielsen.  
After the Second Circuit held that the contracts contained enforceable 
arbitration clauses,59 AnimalFeeds served upon Stolt-Nielsen a demand 
for class arbitration.60  While Stolt-Nielsen contested AnimalFeeds’s 
right to represent a class in the arbitration, the parties entered into a 
supplemental agreement to submit the question of class arbitration to a 
panel of three arbitrators, who were to “follow and be bound by”61 the 
American Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations (“AAA Class Rules”).  AAA Class Rule 3 authorizes the 
arbitrator to “determine as a threshold matter . . . whether the applicable 
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or 
against a class.”62 
Although the parties had stipulated that the arbitration clause was 
silent regarding class arbitration,63 the panel of arbitrators concluded 
that the clause permitted class-wide arbitration,64 accepting 
AnimalFeeds’s argument that “the clause should be construed to permit 
class arbitration as a matter of public policy.”65  Stolt-Nielsen 
challenged the arbitrators’ decision in court, and the Supreme Court 
held that the arbitrators had, in the language of the Act, “exceeded their 
 
contract, it is for the arbitrator, not a court, to determine whether the contract is unconscionable).  
See also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding 
that parties that are silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration “cannot be compelled to submit 
their dispute to class arbitration”).  Cf. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 
2847, 2855–60 & n.6 (2010) (applying FAA precedents to an arbitration dispute in a labor case 
under the Labor Management Relations Act “because they employ the same rules of 
arbitrability”). 
58. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764–65. 
59. JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 175, 181 (2d Cir. 2004). 
60. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765. 
61. Id. (quoting the supplemental agreement). 
62. AAA Class Rule 3 (effective Oct. 8, 2003). 
63. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1768 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
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powers.”66  Finding that its prior decision in Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle67 did not establish “the rule to be applied in deciding 
whether class arbitration is permitted,”68 the Court concluded that “a 
party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class 
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the 
party agreed to do so.”69 
If an arbitration agreement is silent on the issue, the arbitrator cannot 
infer an implicit agreement to submit to class-wide arbitration “because 
class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree 
that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing 
to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”70  Class-wide arbitration not 
only dramatically increases the scope and “commercial stakes” of the 
proceedings, the Court maintained, but it also deprives parties of the 
“presumption of privacy and confidentiality” that ordinarily shrouds 
arbitration.71  These “differences between bilateral and class-action 
arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume . . . that the parties’ 
mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent 
to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”72 
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
In 2011, just one year after Stolt-Nielsen, the Court decided AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.73  The underlying claim in Concepcion 
arose in 2002, when Vincent and Liza Concepcion purchased cell phone 
service from AT&T.  The Concepcions received free phones as 
advertised by AT&T, but they were charged $30.22 in sales tax based 
on the retail price of the phones.74  They filed a suit against AT&T in a 
 
66. Id. at 1767–68 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)). 
67. 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003) (concluding that the arbitrator, rather than a court, should 
interpret the arbitration clause to determine whether it forbade or was silent on class-wide 
arbitration) (plurality opinion). 
68. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772 (footnote omitted). 
69. Id. at 1775. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 1776 (citing AAA Class Rule 9(a)). 
72. Id. (footnote omitted). 
73. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  For analyses of Concepcion and its implications, see Michael A. 
Helfand, Purpose, Precedent, and Politics: Why Concepcion Covers Less Than You Think, 4 Y.B. 
ARB. & MEDIATION (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2022564; Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.  633, 636–39 (2012); Sherry, supra 
note 3, at 3, 5–21; Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 705–17 (2012); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class 
Arbitration after Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 776–81 (2012). 
74. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
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federal court in California, which was later consolidated with a putative 
class action.75  AT&T moved to compel arbitration, invoking the 
contract between the parties, which contained an arbitration provision 
requiring the parties to proceed in their “‘individual capacity, and not as 
a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative 
proceeding.’”76  Opposing the motion to compel arbitration, the 
plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable 
under California law because it barred class-wide procedures.77 
The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, applying 
the California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court78 and finding that the arbitration provision was unconscionable 
because it did not “provide an ‘adequate substitute for class litigation or 
arbitration.’”79  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.80 
The Discover Bank rule applied by the lower federal courts provided 
as follows: 
[W]hen the [class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of 
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged 
that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in 
practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] own 
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.”  Under 
these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under 
California law and should not be enforced.81 
The Concepcions argued that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted 
by the FAA because it barred waivers of class action litigation as well 
as class-wide arbitration, and therefore did not discriminate against 
arbitration.82 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. (quoting the arbitration provision) (conversion from all capital letters by the Court). 
77. Id. at 1745. 
78. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
79. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167 DMS AJB, 2008 WL 5216255, at *9 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740, on remand sub nom. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, 
Inc., 06CV675 DMS NLS, 2012 WL 1681762 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2012) (granting AT&T’s motion 
to compel arbitration).  See also Laster, 2012 WL 1681762 , at *14 (concluding that plaintiffs had 
established the unconscionability of the class action waiver). 
80. Laster, 584 F.3d at 855–59. 
81. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668). 
82. Brief for Respondents at 21–24, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893) (citing 
Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 699, 708, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)). 
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The Supreme Court disagreed.  While noting that section two of the 
FAA “permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable 
‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,’” the Court clarified that this saving clause permits 
invalidation of arbitration clauses only by “generally applicable contract 
defenses,” not “by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive 
their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”83 
Obviously, when state law bars the arbitration of a particular type of 
claim completely, the FAA preempts the state law.84  The Court held, 
however, that the FAA’s preemptive force may also extend to generally 
applicable grounds for the revocation of a contract, such as 
unconscionability, where they are “applied in a fashion that disfavors 
arbitration.”85  For example, the Court hypothesized, if state law 
characterized as unconscionable any contract that eschewed application 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule might formally apply to all 
contracts but it “would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration 
agreements . . . .”86  More generally, section two’s saving clause was 
not intended “to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”87 
While conceding that the “‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to 
‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms,’”88 the Court emphasized a subsidiary goal: 
“‘encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution.’”89  Class-
wide arbitration imposed by a court applying the Discover Bank rule 
interferes with this goal, the Court opined, in three material respects.  
First, “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the 
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the 
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural 
morass than final judgment.”90  The Court cited evidence from the 
AAA that the median time for resolution of a class-wide arbitration was 
583 days, more than three times longer than the average disposition 
 
83. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citations omitted). 
84. Id. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)).  See also Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (per curium) (holding that the FAA 
preempts West Virginia case law, which treats pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal injury 
or wrongful death claims against nursing homes as categorically unenforceable). 
85. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1748. 
88. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 478 (1989)). 
89. Id. at 1749 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
90. Id. at 1751. 
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time for bilateral consumer arbitrations.91  Second, “class arbitration 
requires procedural formality” in order to bind absentees by the award, 
which, the Court suggested, is at odds with the goal of resolving 
disputes efficiently and speedily.92  Third, “class arbitration greatly 
increases risks to defendants” by multiplying the potential cost of a 
losing award while denying effective appellate review, thereby 
pressuring defendants to settle even questionable claims and 
discouraging the use of arbitration altogether.93  The Court concluded 
that California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA because 
it “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress”94 
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan, focused on the basic purpose of the FAA—to ensure 
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements95—and downplayed the 
importance of providing “procedural and cost advantages.”96  Breyer 
rejected the majority’s assumption that individual, rather than class, 
arbitration is a “fundamental attribute” of arbitration,97 maintaining 
instead that “class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration.”98  
To the extent that Congress envisioned arbitration as a tool for resolving 
factual disputes between parties of roughly equal bargaining power, 
California’s unconscionability law may actually further congressional 
objectives.99  And since class arbitration proceedings may take less time 
than class actions in court, the Discover Bank rule may even serve the 
FAA’s (subsidiary) objective of facilitating speedy resolution of 
disputes.100  In response to the dissent, the majority rejoined that “States 
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it 
is desirable for unrelated reasons.”101 
C. The Meaning of Legislative Inaction in the Face of Judicial 
(Mis)interpretation 
As demonstrated in Part I.A above, the FAA’s legislative history 
strongly suggests that Congress intended to limit the Act’s provisions to 
 
91. Id. (citation omitted). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1752 & n.8. 
94. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
95. Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1759. 
98. Id. at 1758. 
99. Id. at 1759 (citations omitted). 
100. Id. at 1759–60. 
101. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion). 
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contracts between companies of roughly equal bargaining power, and 
never intended it to apply to employment agreements or take-it-or-
leave-it consumer contracts.102  Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that 
Congress even contemplated class action litigation at the time it enacted 
the FAA, let alone that it specifically intended to permit class action 
waivers. 
But if the Court has “trespass[ed] on the institutions of democratic 
government”103 by disregarding congressional intent, surely Congress 
has the prerogative to amend the FAA and to legislatively overrule 
Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion and the Court’s decisions extending the FAA 
to employment and consumer contracts.104  After all, Congress has 
primary law-making authority and “‘Congress remains free to alter what 
[the Court] ha[s] done.’”105  As the late Harvard Law professors Hart 
and Sacks maintained in their legendary teaching materials, The Legal 
Process, “court and legislature are in some sense in competition, with 
the legislature having the last word for the future.”106  Or as Columbia 
Law professors Gluck and Graetz put it even more directly in a recent 
New York Times op-ed piece, “It is Congress, not the court, that has the 
constitutional power and responsibility to make difficult legislative 
policy decisions . . . .”107 
At least some members of the current Congress would like to reassert 
legislative primacy by amending the FAA to limit its reach, consistent 
with the legislature’s original intent.  Indeed, the very day that the 
Supreme Court decided Concepcion, Senator Al Franken (D-Minn.), 
Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Representative Hank 
Johnson (D-Ga.) announced that they would reintroduce the Arbitration 
 
102. See supra notes 19–43 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the 
FAA). 
103. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 6, at 402. 
104. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (applying the FAA to an employment 
contract; superseding state law); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) 
(applying the FAA to a consumer contract). 
105. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 419 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)). 
106. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 165 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
Foundation Press 1994) (emphasis added); see also id. at 166 (describing the legislature’s 
discretion to intervene “to determine changes appropriate for the future”). 
107. Abbe R. Gluck & Michael J. Graetz, The Severability Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
2012, at A29 (writing about the Affordable Care Act before the Supreme Court had issued its 
decision upholding the law in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).  
See also Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 317, 317 (2005) (describing “legislative supremacy” as “the belief that Congress, rather 
than the Supreme Court, bears primary responsibility for shaping policy through statutory law”). 
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Fairness Act (“AFA”).108  Their press release explicitly stated that the 
proposed law would “help rectify the Court’s most recent wrong [in 
Concepcion] by restoring consumer rights.”109  The proposed bill would 
do far more than just ensure that groups can band together to proceed 
collectively against employers or other companies.110  If signed into 
law, the AFA would invalidate all pre-dispute agreements that require 
the arbitration of an employment dispute, a consumer dispute or a civil 
rights dispute and would vest authority to determine the validity of such 
agreements in “a court, rather than an arbitrator.”111 
In its “Findings” section, the AFA states that the FAA was “intended 
to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally similar 
sophistication and bargaining power,”112 not to consumer disputes or 
employment disputes.  The AFA seeks to legislatively overrule a “series 
of decisions by the Supreme Court” that “have changed the meaning of 
the Act.”113  Although the bill has been referred to the House 
Committee on the Judiciary,114 earlier versions115 never made it out of 
committee116 and the current version is not expected to be adopted.117  
 
108. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011). 
109. Press Release, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Announce Legislation 
Giving Consumers More Power in the Courts against Corporations (Apr. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1466. 
110. Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration Fairness Act, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Sept. 13, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/concepcion-and-the- 
arbitration-fairness-act (arguing that the AFA “would be an overbroad response to the Court’s 
decision in Concepcion”).  See also John D. Wood, Opening the Door to Justice: Amending the 
Federal Arbitration Act to Remedy the Unjust Use of Predispute Arbitration Agreements (Feb. 
2011) (unpublished student paper, N.Y.U. Law School), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2014428 (espousing an earlier version of the AFA). 
111. S. 987 § 3(a); H.R. 1873 § 3(a).  The section that would authorize courts, rather than 
arbitrators, to determine the “validity and enforceability” of arbitration agreements would 
overrule Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), which concluded that an 
arbitrator, rather than a court, should interpret the arbitration clause to determine whether it 
forbade or was silent on class-wide arbitration.  A narrower legislative fix to address only class 
action waivers might be (mis)read to suggest that Congress actually endorses the application of 
the FAA in employment and consumer contracts and other contracts between parties of unequal 
bargaining power.  Kathryn A. Eidmann, Ledbetter in Congress: The Limits of a Narrow 
Legislative Override, 117 YALE L.J. 971, 972, 979 (2008). 
112. S. 987 § 2; H.R. 1873 § 2. 
113. S. 987 § 2; H.R. 1873 § 2. 
114. See H.R. 1873, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1873 (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2012) (noting that the bill was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary 
on May 12, 2011). 
115. S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 931, 111th Cong. 
(2009); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). 
116. See S. 1782 (110th): Bill Overview, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/110/s1782 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011) (listing S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007) as 
introduced on July 12, 2007, but never enacted); H.R. 3010 (110th): Bill Overview, GOVTRACK, 
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In some cases, Congress’s failure to legislatively overrule a judicial 
interpretation of a statute has been read to signify acquiescence in the 
Court’s interpretation,118 although many reasons apart from 
congressional approval may explain legislative inaction.119  For 
example, when Congress is unaware of the Court’s interpretation of a 
statute, it is not reasonable to ascribe an intention to affirm the judicial 
interpretation.120  Here, however, given that members of Congress have 
introduced the AFA in three successive sessions of Congress in an effort 
to overrule some of the Court’s FAA precedents, it would be difficult to 
maintain that Congress lacks knowledge of the Court’s decisions.121 
 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr3010 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011) (listing H.R. 3010, 
110th Cong. (2007) as introduced on July 12, 2007, but never enacted); S. 931 (111th): Bill 
Overview, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s931 (last visited Sep. 30, 
2011) (listing S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009) as introduced on April 29, 2009, but never enacted); 
H.R. 1020 (111th): Bill Overview, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/ 
hr1020 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011) (listing H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) as introduced on 
February 12, 2009, but never enacted). 
117. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 110 (“[T]he political realities are such that Congress is 
unlikely to enact the AFA.”); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 73, at 629 (“[S]imilar bills have died 
in committee before, and the prospects for this one appear no brighter.”).  In fact, GovTrack.us 
gives it only a 2% chance of passage.  H.R. 1873: Bill Overview, GOVTRACK, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1873 (last visited Sep. 30, 2011).  A proposed 
California state bill that would have barred class action waivers died in committee in July 2012.  
Cheryl Miller, Legislation to Blunt “Concepcion” is Killed in State Assembly, THE RECORDER 
(July 3, 2012, 3:26:14 PM), http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleFriendlyCA.jsp?id= 
1202561826154. 
118. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) (“Congress, by its positive 
inaction, has allowed [the Court’s] decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference 
and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.”); Barrett, 
supra note 107, at 322 (describing “the belief that congressional inaction following the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of a statute reflects congressional acquiescence in it”) (footnote omitted); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69, 71 (1988) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction] (describing the acquiescence rule, the 
reenactment rule and the rejected proposal rule, all of which read meaning into legislative 
inaction); Marshall, supra note 6, at 184 (“[C]ongressional failure to enact legislation reversing a 
judicial decision indicates Congress’ approval of the Court’s interpretation of an earlier statute.”). 
119. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 107, at 335–36 (identifying alternative explanations for 
legislative inaction; “[e]quating the failure to act with agreement reflects a simple and complete 
misunderstanding of the legislative process.”); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra 
note 118, at 69 (questioning “whether legislative inaction really does tell the Court, or us, 
anything about legislative intent”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 
GEO. L.J. 1361, 1404–06 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents] 
(identifying a variety of reasons why Congress might have failed to overrule judicial 
interpretations of a federal statute); Marshall, supra note 6, at 190–91 (identifying a number of 
reasons “why Congress might decline to overrule a decision with which most members 
disagree”). 
120. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 107, at 331–35 (discussing ignorance as a reason for 
rejecting the acquiescence rationale); Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 118, 
at 75–76 (same); Marshall, supra note 6, at 186–90 (same). 
121. But see Marshall, supra note 6, at 189 (questioning the assumption “that just because . . . 
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Even where Congress is aware of a judicial (mis)interpretation of a 
statute and fails to correct it, its inaction may reflect “preoccupation, or 
paralysis”122 rather than acquiescence or affirmation.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has frequently questioned the wisdom of reading 
acquiescence or approval into legislative inaction.123  As Professor 
Eskridge has noted, because many obstacles impede the passage of 
legislation by Congress, “even if a majority of the members of Congress 
disagree with a judicial or administrative interpretation of a statute, it is 
very unlikely that they will be able to amend the statute quickly, if at 
all.”124 
Moreover, whatever little legislative inaction tells us about 
congressional intent, it reveals only the intent of the Congress that failed 
to act, not the intent of the enacting Congress, whose intent is 
traditionally viewed as most relevant for purposes of statutory 
interpretation.125  As the Court has noted, “‘the views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier 
one.’”126  Therefore, even if the 113th Congress declines to pass the 
AFA, it does not mean that the Court in Concepcion correctly 
 
a bill is proposed, a great many members of Congress are aware of the issue”). 
122. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969); accord Marshall, supra note 6, at 190–91.  
Given the recent “hyperpolarization of Congress,” there have been fewer Congressional overrides 
and a dramatic increase in the Supreme Court’s power.  Adam Liptak, In Congress’s Paralysis, A 
Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at A10 (quoting N.Y.U School of Law 
Professor Richard H. Pildes). 
123. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 78 (1974) (“‘The search for significance in 
the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage . . . .’” (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio 
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942))).  See also Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119–20 (1940) 
(“To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to 
venture into speculative unrealities.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 121 (“[W]e walk on quicksand 
when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.”). 
124. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 118, at 99. 
125. See id. at 94–95 (describing Congress as a “discontinuous decisionmaker” and 
identifying the “traditional proposition that the legislative ‘intent’ relevant to statutory 
interpretation is the intent of the enacting Congress”); Marshall, supra note 6, at 188, 193 (noting 
the courts generally adhere to an “originalist model of statutory construction,” trying to 
understand what the enacting Congress intended with the words it chose).  In addition to debating 
the meaning of legislative inaction, the Legal Process students could debate whether it is the 
enacting Congress’s intent that is most relevant for purposes of statutory interpretation, or 
whether statutes should be interpreted “dynamically,” that is, “in light of their present societal, 
political, and legal context.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987).  See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory 
Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 46 (1988) (“[S]tatutes ought to be responsive to today’s 
world.”); Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1095, 1144 (1993) (“[P]ostenactment developments would have provided a reliable tool for 
interpreting the statutes at issue.”). 
126. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (quoting United States 
v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). 
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interpreted the FAA or furthered the intent of the Congress that enacted 
the law in 1925. 
Finally, even if legislative inaction tells us little, if anything, about 
the enacting Congress’s actual intent, in some cases it may support a 
finding of presumed intent.  Professor Eskridge has reformulated the 
Court’s “legislative inaction” cases to impose upon Congress a 
responsibility to correct authoritative interpretations with which it 
disagrees.127  On this reading, Congress’s failure to legislatively 
overrule “building block” judicial interpretations upon which others 
reasonably rely gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the Court’s 
interpretation was correct.128  But Eskridge maintains that the 
“presumption of correctness should be a weak one [if the interests 
harmed by the Court’s interpretation] do not have effective access to the 
political process.”129  Unlike small, well-defined, wealthy groups (e.g., 
phone companies) that have resources to invest in the legislative process 
to secure concentrated benefits and to avoid concentrated costs, 
consumers (such as the Concepcions and other subscribers to AT&T 
phone service) are too diffuse, disorganized and poor to lobby Congress 
to change (an interpretation of) the law with which they disagree. 
In sum, the class action waiver material would invite the Legal 
Process students to consider the competing roles of Congress and the 
Court in law-making; the traditional view that Congress has primary 
responsibility for federal law- and policy-making while the Court has 
primary responsibility for interpreting federal legislation; the proper 
role of legislative history in the interpretive process; and the meaning of 
legislative inaction in the face of judicial (mis)interpretation. 
We say that Congress makes the law and the Court interprets the law; 
but if the Court can ignore legislative intent and interpret legislation in 
such a way as to render it unrecognizable to the Congress that enacted 
the law, and if Congress lacks the political will to correct the Court’s 
action, is it accurate to maintain that Congress retains primary law-
making power?  At least regarding class action waivers, it sure looks 
like the Court, not Congress, is making the law. 
II. FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Just as class action waivers provide a window into Congress’s 
 
127. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, supra note 118, at 108–13. 
128. Id. at 108. 
129. Id. at 114.  See also Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 119, at 1406–
07 (applying public choice theory to explain legislative inaction); Marshall, supra note 6, at 190 
(discussing public choice theory). 
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struggle to retain primary law-making authority vis-à-vis the Court, they 
offer an opportunity to consider the role that administrative agencies 
play in law-making and the extent to which courts must defer to agency 
interpretations of the laws within their purview.130  This Part of the 
Article focuses on two federal agencies, the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”), which have invalidated class action waivers in 
the context of labor and securities disputes, respectively.131  In the 
words of Professor Paul Kirgis: “These agencies are, in effect, telling 
the courts to reopen the doors and start hearing cases.  The result is a 
through-the-looking-glass moment in which agencies defend rights to 
 
130. See infra Part II.C (applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837 (1984) and its progeny). 
131. I first learned of these agency actions in an on-line essay by Professor Paul Kirgis.  See 
Paul F. Kirgis, The Roberts Court vs. the Regulators: Surveying Arbitration’s Next Battleground, 
10 MAYHEW-HITE REP. ON DISP. RESOL. & CTS. (May 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/ 
mayhew-hite/report/volume-10/issue-3/.  In addition to the efforts by the NLRB and FINRA to 
regulate class action waivers, at least one other agency has sought to regulate pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements.  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which enforces the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2012), has interpreted the MMWA to 
bar “pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration provisions covering written warranty agreements” 
and has promulgated a regulation to prohibit “judicial enforcement of such provisions with 
respect to consumer claims brought under the MMWA.”  Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto 
Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 16 C.F.R. 703.5), withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 
(9th Cir. 2012).  Until recently, the Courts of Appeals were split on whether the FTC’s 
interpretation of the MMWA is entitled to Chevron deference.  Compare Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031 
(deferring to the FTC’s interpretation), with Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 
478 & n.14 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that Congress spoke directly to the issue of binding 
arbitration in the FAA and declining to even reach the second step of the Chevron analysis), and 
Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (determining “that the 
FTC’s interpretation of the MMWA is unreasonable” and declining to defer to the FTC 
regulation).  The Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion in Kolev in April 2012.  See also Jonathan D. 
Grossberg, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the Future of 
Consumer Protection, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 661 (2008) (“[T]he MMWA and its 
interpretation by the FTC preclude binding arbitration agreements . . . .  [T]he courts owe 
Chevron deference to the FTC in this area . . . .”); Arbitration—Fifth Circuit Holds Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act Claims Arbitrable Despite Contrary Agency Interpretation.—Walton v. Rose 
Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2003) 
(criticizing Walton’s “flawed rationale,” but not its conclusion).  Moreover, in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress authorized the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to study the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer 
transactions and to promulgate regulations prohibiting such agreements if it “finds that such a 
prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the 
protection of consumers.”  12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2006).  In April 2012, the CFPB solicited 
comments from the public in an effort to “identify the appropriate scope, methods, and sources of 
data for the Study” required by Dodd-Frank.  Request for Information Regarding Scope, 
Methods, and Data Sources for Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 77 
Fed. Reg. 25148 (Apr. 27, 2012).  Comments were due on June 23, 2012. 
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court adjudication against incursions by the Supreme Court.”132  
Following an examination of the steps taken by these agencies, this Part 
analyzes the obligation, if any, of courts to defer to them and the 
Supreme Court’s particular dilemma: must it defer to agency 
interpretations that conflict with its own powerfully pro-arbitration 
agenda? 
A. The NLRB Interprets the National Labor Relations Act to Preclude 
Class Action Waivers 
In a decision of first impression issued in a proceeding against D.R. 
Horton, Inc. (“Horton”),133 the NLRB considered whether Horton could 
require its employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to refrain 
from pursuing any claims against it other than through individual 
arbitration.  The Board held that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) of 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) when it “requires 
employees covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to 
sign an agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or 
collective claims addressing their wages, hours or other working 
conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.”134  
In other words, the NLRB held that the class action waiver Horton 
required its employees to sign violated the NLRA. 
In so ruling, the Board relied on section 7 of the NLRA, which 
assures employees a right to engage in “concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,”135 
and which has been interpreted to protect their right to join together to 
collectively pursue workplace grievances through litigation136 or 
arbitration.137  Since the agreement at issue explicitly barred employees 
from bringing collective claims in any forum, and since section 8(a)(1) 
of the NLRA “makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer ‘to 
interfere with . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in’ 
 
132. Kirgis, supra note 131. 
133. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *10 & n.18 (Jan. 3, 2012) (distinguishing 
two cases that had held that class action waivers do not violate the NLRA: Slawienski v. Nephron 
Pharm. Corp., No. 1:10-CV-0460-JEC, 2010 WL 5186622 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2010); and Webster 
v. Perales, No. 3:07-CV-00919-M, 2008 WL 282305 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2008)). 
134. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
135. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
136. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2 (citing, inter alia, Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 
U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978), and Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 NLRB 942, 948–49 (1942)). 
137. Id. at *3 (citing, inter alia, NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836 (1984)).  
See also id. at *9 (construing employees’ class and collective actions as protected concerted 
activity because their goal is concerted activity for mutual aid or protection). 
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Section 7,”138 the Board held that the contract violated section 8 of the 
NLRA.139  In short, “the prohibition of individual agreements imposed 
on employees as a means of requiring that they waive their right to 
engage in protected, concerted activity lies at the core of the 
prohibitions contained in Section 8.”140 
The NLRB rejected the company’s principal argument that its 
decision conflicted with the FAA and the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Concepcion.  Cognizant of its obligation to seek to accommodate the 
policies underlying both the NLRA and the FAA, the Board offered 
four reasons why its finding that the class action waiver was unlawful 
did not conflict with the FAA or its underlying policies.141 
First, ruling that a class action waiver violates the NLRA does not 
discriminate against arbitration because it “does not rest on ‘defenses 
that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact 
that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’”142  Even a contract that failed 
to mention arbitration, but which barred employees from pursuing class 
actions in court, would violate the NLRA under the Board’s 
reasoning.143 
Second, Supreme Court precedents make clear that agreements to 
arbitrate federal statutory claims “may not require a party to ‘forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute.’”144  Here, even though the 
charging party, Michael Cuda, ultimately claimed the protection of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), he first claimed a right to present 
the FLSA claim collectively, a substantive right itself secured by the 
NLRA.145  Since the class action waiver interfered with the exercise of 
this substantive right, the FAA did not require enforcement of the 
waiver.146 
Third, under the FAA, arbitration agreements may be invalidated 
upon any “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract,”147 and the Board noted that “it is a defense to contract 
 
138. Id. at *4 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012)). 
139. Id. at *6 (opining that the agreement at issue here “implicates prohibitions that predate 
the NLRA and are central to modern Federal labor policy”). 
140. Id. at *5. 
141. Id. at *7–12. 
142. Id. at *9 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011)). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at *12 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).  
See also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 
2012)). 
145. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *12. 
146. Id. at *11–13. 
147. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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enforcement that a term of the contract is against public policy.”148  In 
cases raising this defense, courts must balance the “interest in favor of 
enforcing a contract term” against the public policy that would be 
violated by its enforcement.149  The NLRA embodies a strong federal 
policy protecting employees’ rights to collectively pursue litigation or 
arbitration, as well as a strong policy against “yellow dog” contracts, 
which would require employees to waive rights to engage in collective 
action.150 While recognizing that Concepcion emphasized a 
countervailing interest in facilitating streamlined proceedings, the Board 
distinguished the present case from Concepcion.151  There, tens of 
thousands of consumers had potential claims against the phone 
company, whereas the average employer has only twenty employees.  
Thus, class-wide arbitration of an employment case would be far less 
costly and cumbersome than the massive class-wide proceeding feared 
by the Court in Concepcion.  “[H]olding that an employer violates the 
NLRA by requiring employees, as a condition of employment, to waive 
their right to pursue collective legal redress in both judicial and arbitral 
forums accommodates the policies underlying both the NLRA and the 
FAA to the greatest extent possible.”152 
Finally, the Board invoked an earlier labor statute, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act (“NLGA”), which ensures workers “full freedom of 
association” and protects them “from the interference, restraint, or 
coercion of employers” in “concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”153  Section 4 of 
the NLGA protects the rights of persons, singly or collectively, to aid 
any person interested or participating in any labor dispute who is 
prosecuting any action in any federal or state court.154  Since the NLGA 
was enacted after the FAA, and since it explicitly repeals all acts and 
parts of acts in conflict with its provisions,155 the Board concluded that 
the “FAA would have to yield” if there were a “direct conflict” between 
the FAA and the NLGA.156 
Final orders of the NLRB, like its decision in D.R. Horton, are 
 
148. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *11 (citing Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 
386, 392 (1987)). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at *5. 
151. Id. at *12. 
152. Id. 
153. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
154. Id. § 104(d). 
155. Id. § 115. 
156. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *12. 
3_WASSERMAN.DOCX 12/14/2012  3:59 PM 
416 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
subject to review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Circuit in 
which the unfair labor practice occurred or a person aggrieved by the 
order resides or transacts business, or in the D.C. Circuit.157  Horton’s 
Petition for Review of the NLRB decision, filed in the Fifth Circuit on 
January 13, 2012, is still pending.158 
Following discussion in Part II.B below of the action taken by 
FINRA to rein in class action waivers, Part II.C will consider the 
amount of deference to which these agency actions are entitled and the 
Court’s current dilemma. 
B. FINRA Bars Securities Firms from Enforcing Class Action Waivers 
FINRA describes itself as “the largest independent regulator for all 
securities firms doing business in the United States.”159  It was formed 
in 2007, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
approved the merger of the enforcement arms of the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”).160  While both the NYSE and the NASD began as voluntary 
organizations of broker-dealers and operated for decades as self-
regulating organizations (“SROs”),161 the Securities Acts Amendments 
of 1975 gave the SEC greater authority to regulate and supervise 
them.162 
From its inception, FINRA “was designed as a monopoly SRO under 
the active and direct oversight of the SEC.”163  Since 1987, when the 
Supreme Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims 
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were enforceable,164 
virtually all disputes between broker-dealers and their customers have 
been arbitrated under FINRA supervision.165 
 
157. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012). 
158. Petition for Review, D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012) (No. 12-60031) 
(on file with author). 
159. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited July 10, 2012). 
160. Carrie Johnson, SEC Approves One Watchdog For Brokers Big and Small, WASH. POST, 
July 27, 2007, at D1; Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 151–52 
(2008).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012) (authorizing the SEC to grant the registration of self-
regulatory organizations). 
161. Karmel, supra note 160, at 153, 158. 
162. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. 
163. Karmel, supra note 160, at 152.  See also id. at 169 (noting that FINRA is “very close” to 
qualifying as a government agency). 
164. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227–38 (1987). 
165. Kirgis, supra note 131.  See also Karmel, supra note 160, at 153 (noting that the NYSE 
and the NASD “operated arbitration facilities for disputes between member firms and their 
employees and between member firms and their customers.”). 
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FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3), effective December 5, 2011,166 provides 
that no pre-dispute arbitration agreement shall include any condition 
that “limits the ability of a party to file a claim in court permitted to be 
filed in court under the rules of the forums in which a claim may be 
filed under the agreement.”167  The FINRA Code of Arbitration 
Procedure, which contains “the rules of [a forum] in which a claim may 
be filed” under a securities-related arbitration agreement, bars member 
firms from 
enforc[ing] any arbitration agreement against a member of a certified 
or putative class action with respect to any claim that is the subject of 
the certified or putative class action until: The class certification is 
denied; The class is decertified; The member of the certified or 
putative class is excluded from the class by the court; or The member 
of the certified or putative class elects not to participate in the class or 
withdraws from the class according to conditions set by the court, if 
any.168 
Taken together, these provisions guarantee customers the right to bring 
class actions against brokerage firms in court and bar the enforcement 
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements regarding claims that are the 
subject of class litigation.169 
 
166. FINRA Regulatory Notice 11-19 (Apr. 2011); FINRA, Rule Conversion Chart: NASD to 
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ruleconversionchart/ (last updated Feb. 9, 2012).  The predecessor 
to FINRA Rule 2268(d) was NASD Rule 3110, which was approved by the SEC in the late 
1980s.  Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. C-12-518EDL, 2012 WL 1859030, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. May 11, 2012). 
167. FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 2268(d)(3), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955. 
168. FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 12204(d), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4110.  See also 
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes Rule 13204(d), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4207 (valid 
through July 8, 2012) (similar provision governing industry disputes).  In April 2012, the SEC 
approved an amendment of Rule 13204 to preclude the arbitration under the FINRA Industry 
Code of collective claims under the FLSA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the 
Equal Pay Act.  See Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated 
Approval of a Proposed Rule Change, As Modified By Amendment No. 1, Amending Rule 13204 
of the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes to Preclude Collective Action Claims 
From Being Arbitrated, SEC Release No. 34-66774, 77 Fed. Reg. 22374, 22375 (April 13, 2012); 
see also FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes Rule 13204, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&record_id=14570 (effective 
July 9, 2012). 
169. Kirgis, supra note 131.  See also FINRA Rule 2268(f), http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9955 (“All agreements shall include a 
statement that ‘No person shall . . . seek to enforce any pre-dispute arbitration agreement against 
any person who has initiated in court a putative class action; or who is a member of a putative 
class . . . until: (i) the class certification is denied; or (ii) the class is decertified; or (iii) the 
customer is excluded from the class by the court.’”). 
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In approving the section of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 
that was the predecessor to this section of the FINRA Code of 
Arbitration Procedure, the SEC commented 
that the judicial system has already developed the procedures to 
manage class action claims.  Entertaining such claims through 
arbitration . . . would be difficult, duplicative and wasteful . . . .  The 
Commission agrees with the NASD’s position that, in all cases, class 
actions are better handled by the courts and that investors should have 
access to the courts to resolve class actions efficiently. 
 The Commission finds that the proposed rule change . . . is 
consistent with the requirements of Section 15A(b)(6) of the 
[Securities Exchange] Act . . . [which] requires . . . that the rules of the 
NASD be designed to protect investors and the public interest . . . .  
The Commission believes that investor access to the courts should be 
preserved for class actions . . . .170 
Notwithstanding the FINRA Rules assuring brokerage customers a 
right to pursue class litigation in court even in the face of a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement, the brokerage firm Charles Schwab (“Schwab”) 
inserted a class action waiver in its account agreement in the aftermath 
of Concepcion and distributed it to almost seven million customers.171  
On February 1, 2012, the FINRA Department of Enforcement filed a 
disciplinary proceeding against Charles Schwab, alleging that its class 
action waiver violates FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3).172  On the very same 
day, Schwab filed a declaratory judgment action against FINRA in 
federal court, maintaining that the FINRA Rule does not bar class action 
waivers, and even if it does, the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood173 and Concepcion prevent FINRA 
from enforcing the Rule.174 
 
170. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions 
From Arbitration Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31371, 1992 WL 324491, at *3 
(Oct. 28, 1992) [hereinafter SEC Release] (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
171. Complaint & Request for Expedited Hearing ¶¶ 12–13, Dep’t of Enforcement v. Charles 
Schwab & Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201 (Feb. 1, 2012) [hereinafter FINRA 
Complaint], http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/industry/p125 
516.pdf. 
172. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20, 26 & 32.  The FINRA Complaint also alleges violations of FINRA Rules 
2268(d)(1) and 2010.  Id. ¶¶ 4–6, 20, 26 & 32.  The filing of a complaint is just the first step in a 
five-stage disciplinary process for the regulation of broker-dealers, which includes administrative 
review of FINRA’s ruling on the complaint by the SEC and judicial review by a federal appellate 
court.  See Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. C–12–518 EDL, 2012 WL 1859030, at *2, *5 
(N.D. Cal. May 11, 2012). 
173. 132 S. Ct. 665, 672–73 (2012) (holding that claims under the Credit Repair Organization 
Act are arbitrable notwithstanding a non-waiver provision in the statute). 
174. Complaint for Declaratory and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 34–39, 
Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. 3:12-CV-00518-EDL, 2012 WL 1859030 (N.D. Cal. 
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On May 11, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California granted FINRA’s motion to dismiss the complaint 
without leave to amend.175  Schwab’s failure to exhaust the FINRA 
administrative process, which culminates in administrative review by 
the SEC and then judicial review by a federal court of appeals, deprived 
the court of jurisdiction.176  Schwab has not appealed the district court’s 
dismissal.177  Thus, the FINRA Rules have not been enjoined, and the 
FINRA complaint against Schwab is wending its way through the 
administrative process.  The SEC, which earlier approved the FINRA 
Rules, may eventually be called upon to determine whether Schwab’s 
class action waiver violates them, and a federal court of appeals may 
ultimately review the SEC’s decision and determine the validity of the 
FINRA Rules.178  In so doing, a court likely will need to determine the 
extent to which FINRA’s (or the SEC’s) interpretation of the federal 
securities laws is entitled to Chevron deference, as will the Supreme 
Court if it ultimately reviews the appellate court’s decision. 
C. Chevron Deference, if Any, Owed to these Agency Actions 
Professor Paul Kirgis put his finger on the Legal Process issue that 
the NLRB decision and the FINRA Rules present: “they will likely pit 
the ‘federal policy favoring arbitration’ that the Supreme Court has 
divined from the [FAA] against the principle of deference to agency 
decision-making enshrined in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.”179  In other words, since the NLRB ruling and 
the FINRA Rules invalidate class action waivers in certain 
circumstances, the Supreme Court may eventually have to determine 
whether these agency actions are entitled to deference under Chevron 
even if they conflict with Concepcion and the Court’s other pro-
arbitration precedents.180 
 
2012). 
175. Charles Schwab, 2012 WL 1859030, at *1. 
176. Id. at *5–10.  See also id. at *2, *5 (providing an overview of the disciplinary process). 
177. Email from Gilbert Serota, Attorney for Charles Schwab & Co., to author (June 13, 2012, 
16:26 EDT) (on file with author). 
178. See supra note 172 (discussing the administrative and judicial review steps in the 
disciplinary process). 
179. Kirgis, supra note 131 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837 (1984)). 
180. The use of the generic phrase “Chevron deference” belies a continuum of deference 
regimes that the Supreme Court has applied over the years in various circumstances.  See William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098–1120 
(2008) (describing the continuum of deference regimes); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. 
Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2629–30 (2006) 
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This Section begins with a brief introduction to the Court’s decision 
in Chevron, which mandates deference to an agency’s interpretation of 
legislation within its regulatory authority, and then turns to the 
interesting Chevron-related issues that the NLRB ruling and the FINRA 
Rules raise.  In the words of Professor Cass Sunstein, the Chevron 
“decision has become foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text—
the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of 
authority between federal courts and administrative agencies.”181 
1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
In Chevron, an environmental group, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (“NRDC”), challenged a regulation promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977.182  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had struck 
down the EPA regulation, but the Supreme Court held that an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute within its purview is entitled to deference: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue.  
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the 
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.183 
Under Chevron’s second step, regulations that an agency issues 
pursuant to an express delegation of authority from Congress are 
“binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or 
 
(noting a continuum); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (differentiating between Chevron’s two-step regime and the multi-
factor approach embodied in the Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  For a 
recent look on Chevron and its history, see Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of 
Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI L.J. 143 (2012).  
181. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).  Professor 
Richard Pierce goes further, calling Chevron “one of the most important constitutional law 
decisions in history”  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 
2225, 2227 (1997) [hereinafter Pierce, Reconciling Chevron].  But see Eskridge & Baer, supra 
note 180, at 1090 (“[T]he Court usually does not apply Chevron to cases that are . . . Chevron-
eligible.”); id. at 1120 (“Chevron is not the alpha and the omega of Supreme Court agency-
deference jurisprudence.”). 
182. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
183. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). 
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capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”184  Even 
where Congress has not expressly delegated authority to implement a 
particular statutory provision, 
it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority 
and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the 
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses 
ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one 
about which “Congress did not actually have an intent” as to a 
particular result.185 
In the Legal Process class I used to teach, after reading Chevron, we 
considered the reasons why legislation is often ambiguous,186 and we 
debated which institution of government should have authority to 
resolve the ambiguities.  In considering whether and why agency 
interpretations are entitled to deference,187 we observed that Congress 
not only expressly delegates authority to agencies to interpret statutes 
through the promulgation of regulations, but it impliedly delegates 
authority to agencies by leaving gaps or ambiguities in statutes they 
administer.  We also noted that agency administrators often have greater 
subject matter expertise than generalist judges.  We recognized that 
while agency administrators are not popularly elected, the heads of 
agencies are appointed (and confirmed) by elected officials and 
therefore have greater (if indirect) political accountability than federal 
judges.  Finally, we debated whether deference to agency interpretations 
promotes legislative supremacy.188  Thus, we discussed the extent to 
which implied congressional intent, differing institutional competencies, 
 
184. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 844) (footnote omitted); see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011) (citing the “arbitrary or capricious” standard under Chevron’s 
second step).  Substantial deference is owed to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.  
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 
(1997).  In fact, an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations “must be given ‘controlling 
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”  Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (citation omitted); accord Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
185. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845). 
186. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (identifying congressional preference to have expert 
agency decide specific issues, congressional inattention, and political stalemate).  See also 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of 
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1244–47 (1989) (discussing congressional deference to 
expert agencies and an interest in retaining political cover).  
187. Sunstein contends that the Court in Chevron “announced its two-step approach without 
giving a clear sense of the theory that justified it.”  Sunstein, supra note 181, at 195. 
188. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 865–66.  See also Eskridge & Schwartz, supra note 180, at 
2626–27 (observing that agencies are in many ways more accountable than the judiciary because 
they issue rules following both notice and public comment, and are directly accountable to both 
the President and Congress); Pierce, Reconciling Chevron, supra note 181, at 2228–37. 
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and separation of powers concerns counsel in favor of deference to 
agency action.189 
The NLRB ruling and the FINRA Rules would not only facilitate a 
discussion of the theoretical rationales underlying Chevron deference, 
but they would provide the Legal Process students with an opportunity 
to apply the Chevron analysis to discrete new sets of facts.  The students 
could scrutinize the texts of the NLRA and the Securities Exchange Act 
and their legislative histories to determine whether the laws “directly 
spoke” to the question of the enforceability of class action waivers.190  
If the first step was satisfied, the students could move onto the second 
step, debating whether the NLRB decision in Horton offered a well-
reasoned explanation why class action waivers frustrate the rights of 
employees to engage in “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or 
protection,”191 and whether the SEC reasonably concluded that the 
FINRA Rules or their predecessors were designed “to protect investors 
and the public interest.”192 
While the NLRB ruling and FINRA Rules would provide great 
vehicles for exploring these Chevron basics, the Legal Process students 
could dig deeper into the Chevron analysis, puzzling over a few of the 
dicier issues raised by these administrative actions, namely: (1) when an 
entity is considered a governmental agency entitled to Chevron 
deference; (2) when a ruling has the force of law or procedural formality 
required to qualify for Chevron deference; and (3) whether agency 
actions are entitled to deference if they address matters beyond the 
agency’s subject matter expertise.  In other words, the students could 
consider the scope of “Chevron’s domain.”193  This Part will briefly 
examine these issues in turn. 
2. Is FINRA a Government Agency Eligible for Chevron Deference? 
In most cases involving Chevron deference, the agency’s status as a 
governmental agency is unquestioned.  Typically, Congress creates an 
administrative agency and delegates to it certain responsibilities by 
statute.  The NLRB fits into this standard mold: Congress enacted the 
 
189. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 836 (“Chevron rests on an implied delegation 
from Congress . . . .  Congress has ultimate authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine, and  
. . . the courts should attend carefully to the signals Congress sends about its interpretive 
wishes.”). 
190. Accord Kirgis, supra note 131. 
191. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012), cited in D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2 (Jan. 3, 
2012).  See also supra Part II.A (discussing Horton). 
192. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012), cited in SEC Release, supra note 170, at *3. 
193. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 835. 
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NLRA in 1935, creating the NLRB and delegating to it authority to 
make rules and regulations necessary to carry out its provisions.194  
Other agencies, such as the EPA (the focus of Chevron itself), are 
created by executive order.195 
FINRA’s status as a government agency is less obvious than either 
the NLRB or the EPA because the NYSE and the NASD, the 
enforcement arms of which were merged to create FINRA,196 began as 
voluntary organizations of broker-dealers and operated for decades as 
SROs.197 Yet today, FINRA conducts disciplinary actions and 
promulgates rules that govern the industry—functions that appear to be 
governmental.198 So is FINRA a government agency eligible for 
Chevron deference? 
To qualify as an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act, an 
entity or person must be an “authority of the Government of the United 
States.”199  The question then becomes in what circumstances does a 
person or entity qualify as an “authority”?  According to one leading 
treatise, an agency must have the power to take legally binding action, 
to make final dispositions, or to perform governmental functions.200  
Does FINRA meet these standards? 
Professor Roberta Karmel, former Commissioner of the SEC, former 
director of the NYSE and former member of the National Adjudicatory 
Council of the NASD,201 has written a thoughtful article on FINRA’s 
status vel non as a government agency.202  Karmel does not focus on the 
Chevron deference issue per se, but rather on FINRA’s immunity from 
suit, the preemptive force of its rules and the constitutional rights of 
 
194. Pub. L. No. 74-198, §§ 3, 6, 49 Stat. 449, 451–52 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 153, 156 (2012)).  See also Exec. Order 6763 (June 29, 1934), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14708#axzz1yMf4r3PI (stating that prior to 
enactment of the NLRA, President Franklin Roosevelt had issued an executive order creating an 
NLRB). 
195. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (July 9, 1970), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. app. at 202 (2006).  See also Executive Order 11,548, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,677 (July 20, 1970) 
(specifying responsibilities to be vested in the Administrator of the EPA). 
196. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing the creation of FINRA). 
197. Karmel, supra note 160, at 153, 158. 
198. Id. at 159. 
199. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012). 
200. I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.2, at 4–5 (5th ed. 2010). 
201. Karmel, supra note 160, at 151 n.a1. 
202. See id. at 152 (“[C]ategorizing FINRA as a government agency, at this time, would not 
necessarily be useful . . . but when FINRA is exercising investigative and disciplinary functions it 
should be treated like a government agency.”); id. at 159 (“[W]ith respect to at least some of its 
activities, and in particular disciplinary actions and rule-making, FINRA will be performing 
functions that can be considered governmental.”). 
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persons it investigates and prosecutes.203  Karmel notes that the origins 
of FINRA’s regulatory authority were contractual, not governmental—
“a matter of private contract between the NYSE and its members.”204  
Moreover, with respect to its disciplinary actions and rule-making, 
“FINRA [performs] functions that can be considered governmental.”205 
In all likelihood, the courts will sidestep the question of FINRA’s 
status as a government agency because the SEC, created by Congress in 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934206 and whose status as a 
governmental agency is unquestioned, has expansive power to oversee 
the arbitration procedures employed by FINRA.207  FINRA Rules must 
receive SEC approval before they become effective.208  Moreover, the 
SEC has statutory authority to “abrogate, add to and delete from” 
existing FINRA and other SRO rules,209 as well as de novo authority to 
cancel, reduce or set aside sanctions imposed by FINRA.210  For these 
reasons, courts have treated FINRA Rules as having the “force and 
effect” of federal regulations,211 and as a result it seems quite likely that 
the FINRA rules are eligible for Chevron deference.212  The Legal 
 
203. Id. at 171–98. 
204. Id. at 196.  See also id. at 168 (“[I]t is no[] longer a voluntary SRO.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
205. Id. at 159. 
206. Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d 
(2012)). 
207. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227–33 (1987) (describing the 
SEC’s “expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the 
SROs”). 
208. 15 U.S.C. §78s(b)(1) (2012).  See also Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, No. C-12-
518EDL, 2012 WL 1859030, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2012) (noting that FINRA “file[d] 
proposed rules with the SEC, which then had authority to approve or disapprove all proposed 
rules”). 
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (providing that the SEC “by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete 
from . . . the rules of a [SRO] . . . as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the 
fair administration of the [SRO], to conform its rules to requirements of this chapter  
. . . , or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter”). 
210. Id. § 78s(d)–(e); Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate about 
Securities Self-Regulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA. 
TAX REV. 135, 151 (2011). 
211. Charles Schwab, 2012 WL 1859030, at *1 (“Because of the SEC’s oversight, FINRA 
Rules approved by the SEC are expressions of federal legislative power and have the force and 
effect of a federal regulation.”).  See also Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 
1119, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he NASD arbitration procedures . . . have preemptive force over 
conflicting state law.”); Karmel, supra note 160, at 183 (noting that in certain cases, “SRO rules 
were essentially treated as SEC rules, and the SROs were therefore essentially regarded as state 
actors”). 
212. See Karmel, supra note 160, at 196 (noting that none of the cases where SRO rules have 
been held to preempt federal antitrust laws “focused on the fact that an SRO rule was displacing 
the antitrust laws.  Rather, the focus was on the SEC’s authority and the SEC’s oversight of the 
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Process students might nevertheless relish the opportunity to consider 
the nature of government and why the classification as a government 
agency matters. 
3. Does the NLRB Ruling Have the Force of Law or Procedural 
Formality to Qualify for Chevron Deference? 
Even if the NLRB and FINRA (or the SEC) qualify as governmental 
agencies, their rulings and rules are not entitled to Chevron deference 
unless they have authority “to make rules carrying the force of law” and 
their interpretations were “promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”213  According to the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead 
Corp., tariff classifications issued by the United States Customs Service 
“are beyond the Chevron pale,”214 as are interpretations in opinion 
letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines,215 although these classifications and interpretations may be 
“entitled to respect” to the extent they have the “power to persuade.”216 
In concluding that tariff classifications are ineligible for Chevron 
deference, the Court in Mead noted that 46 different Customs Service 
offices churned out between 10,000 and 15,000 tariff classifications per 
year, suggesting a lack of intent that its cursory rulings, issued without 
great deliberation and care, would have the force of law.217  This 
threshold inquiry into a rule’s “force of law,” which logically precedes 
the Chevron two-step analysis, is part of the Chevron “step zero” 
inquiry,218 which asks “whether the Chevron framework applies at 
all.”219 
In determining whether Congress delegated an agency authority to 
“make rules carrying the force of law,” the Court observed that 
 
conduct in question”). 
213. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see also id. at 232 
(“[I]nterpretive rules . . . enjoy no Chevron status as a class.”); Eskridge & Schwartz, supra note 
180, at 2627 (“Chevron does not apply unless Congress has delegated authority to create binding 
legal orders or rules.”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 837 (“Congress impliedly 
delegates the power to interpret only when it grants the agency power to take action that binds the 
public with the force of law.”). 
214. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234. 
215. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
216. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
217. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233–34. 
218. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 836 (coining the phrase); Sunstein, 
supra note 181, at 191 & n.19 (borrowing the phrase for the article’s title). 
219. Sunstein, supra note 181, at 191.  A separate part of the “step zero” inquiry asks whether 
a fundamental issue that goes to the heart of the regulatory scheme is involved, in which case the 
amount of deference owed is reduced on the theory that Congress has not delegated agencies 
authority to resolve such fundamental issues.  Id. at 193. 
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“[d]elegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as 
by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional 
intent.”220  For example, in a 2011 decision, the Court concluded that a 
Treasury Department rule was entitled to Chevron deference, noting 
that “[t]he Department issued the . . . rule only after notice-and-
comment procedures, . . . a consideration identified in our precedents as 
a ‘significant’ sign that a rule merits Chevron deference.”221  The 
FINRA Rules at issue here were adopted after a notice-and-comment 
period222 and therefore appear to satisfy Chevron “step zero.” 
But what of the NLRB ruling?  While rules adopted after a notice-
and-comment period may exemplify the type of administrative 
formality that merits Chevron deference, the Court has frequently 
accorded such deference to formal agency adjudications as well.223  The 
 
220. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27; see also id. at 230–31 (“[T]he overwhelming number of our 
cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or 
formal adjudication.  That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to 
Chevron authority, the want of that procedure . . . does not decide the case, for we have 
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was 
required and none was afforded . . . .”) (footnote and citations omitted); Sunstein, supra note 182, 
at 223 (“[T]he relationship among ‘force of law,’ formal procedure, and Chevron deference is 
confusing.”).  Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts are careful to differentiate between 
rules that have the force of law (violations of which subject the violator to a sanction) and 
interpretive rules or procedure rules, which lack the force of law and impose no sanction.  
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original 
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 472, 474, 582–87 (2002) (discussing Congress’s original 
convention for distinguishing between legislative and housekeeping rules and advocating that it 
be adopted as a canon of interpretation).  
221. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 714 (2011) 
(citations omitted). 
222. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Adopting FINRA Rules Regarding Books 
and Records in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63784 (Jan. 
27, 2011) (approving FINRA Rule 2268 following a notice-and-comment period); SEC Approves 
Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Books and Records, Regulatory Notice 11-19 (Apr. 2011) 
(announcing the implementation date of FINRA Rule 2268); Order Approving Proposed Rule 
Change Relating to the Adoption of NASD Rules 12000 Through 14000 Series as FINRA Rules 
in the New Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58643 (Sept. 25, 
2008) (approving a proposal to include the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes 
in the consolidated FINRA Rulebook following a notice-and-comment period); SEC Approves 
New Consolidated FINRA Rules, FINRA Announces SEC Approval and Effective Date for New 
Consolidated FINRA Rules, Regulatory Notice 08-57 (Oct. 2008) (announcing the 
implementation date for the first phase of the new consolidated FINRA Rules).  See also Eskridge 
& Baer, supra note 180, at 1186 & n.321 (identifying “almost two dozen statutes that regularly 
trigger Chevron deference,” including the Securities Exchange Act). 
223. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 & n.12 (citing cases).  The Court has deferred to agency 
interpretations adopted through even less formal means.  See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 
221–22 (2002) (“[T]he fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through means 
less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking does not automatically deprive that 
interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due. . . .  [T]he interstitial nature of the legal 
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Supreme Court in Mead explained, “[i]t is fair to assume generally that 
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law 
when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure 
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a 
pronouncement of such force.”224 
The NLRA, which sets out the NLRB’s adjudicatory process, 
requires that testimony be reduced to writing and that the Board “state 
its findings of fact”; it authorizes individuals to seek review in the court 
of appeals if they are aggrieved by a final Board order.225  These 
statutorily required procedural protections are designed to ensure 
deliberation and the fairness of the process.  Interestingly, while the 
NLRB’s adjudicatory process affords these protections, the Board must 
petition a court to enforce its orders,226 suggesting that its rulings may 
nevertheless lack the force of law.227  The Supreme Court has regularly 
deferred to NLRB rulings notwithstanding the non-self-executing nature 
of NLRB rulings.228  In fact, Mead cited cases deferring to NLRB 
rulings to illustrate that agency adjudications may be sufficiently formal 
to qualify for Chevron deference.229 
Is it enough, then, that Congress has authorized the NLRB to engage 
in formal adjudication or must it have power to enter self-executing 
orders?  The answer may depend on the theoretical rationale for 
Chevron deference.  On the one hand, if Chevron rests principally on 
 
question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to the administration 
of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has 
given the question over a long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate 
lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation . . . .”).  See also Sunstein, 
supra note 181, at 216–19 (discussing Barnhart and its case-by-case inquiry into the 
interpretative method used). 
224. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
225. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012). 
226. Id. § 160(e). 
227. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 180, at 1123–24 & n.152 (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has assumed the NLRB has law-making authority despite lacking the ability to enforce its 
own orders); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 838–39 n.23 (“NLRB adjudications are not 
entitled to Chevron deference because NLRB orders are not self-executing.”); Sunstein, supra 
note 181, at 223, 247–48 & n.252 (“As I have noted, some agency actions do not have force of 
law, even if based on formal procedures (e.g., the decisions of the NLRB).”). 
228. See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 408–09 (1996) (according Chevron 
deference to a decision of the NLRB that classified “live-haul” workers as covered employees 
rather than as exempt agricultural laborers); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324–
25 (1994) (according Chevron deference to a decision of the NLRB that ordered the reinstatement 
of an employee who had provided false testimony before the administrative law judge).  See also 
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 180, at 1124 n.152 & 1186 & n.321 (identifying the NLRA as a 
statute “that regularly trigger[s] Chevron deference”). 
229. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.12 (citing, inter alia, Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 408–09; ABF 
Freight Sys., 510 U.S. at 324–25). 
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implied congressional intent, and if “the decision by Congress to require 
agencies to seek judicial enforcement of their orders . . . [implies] that 
Congress did not intend to delegate primary interpretational authority to 
such an agency,”230 then only agencies with power to enter self-
executing orders should be entitled to Chevron deference.  On the other 
hand, if the principal rationale for deference is institutional competency 
or agency expertise, then agency actions that are the product of 
procedures formal enough to ensure deliberation should be entitled to 
deference, even if they are not self-executing.  Surely the NLRB’s 
decision in Horton would provide the Legal Process students with a 
meaningful opportunity to explore Chevron’s “step zero” and to 
consider the types of agency actions that qualify for Chevron deference. 
4. Do the NLRB Ruling and the FINRA Rules Trench upon Federal 
Policies beyond the Agencies’ Authority? 
While these “step zero” issues would provoke lively discussions in 
the Legal Process class, the issue that really would engage the students, 
I think, is the scope of Chevron deference.  Assuming that both the 
NLRB and FINRA (or at least the SEC) qualify as agencies and their 
rules and rulings have the force of law or are the product of sufficient 
procedural formality to qualify for Chevron deference, what happens if 
their rules or rulings conflict with policy objectives underlying other 
federal laws?  Stated differently, is the portion of the NLRB decision 
that concluded that it did not conflict with the FAA entitled to Chevron 
deference?  To the extent that FINRA (or the SEC) concluded that its 
Rules are valid notwithstanding Concepcion, is its reading entitled to 
deference?  Here, several formidable arguments against deference 
deserve mention. 
First, the Supreme Court has declined to defer to the NLRB’s 
interpretation of a statute “far removed from its expertise”231 and has 
“never deferred to the Board’s remedial preferences where such 
preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies 
unrelated to the NLRA.”232  For example, in Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the Board had ordered a company, Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, to offer reinstatement and back pay to four 
employees it had fired due to union organizing activity in violation of 
 
230. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 892. 
231. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143–44 (2001)  (citing S. S.S. 
Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 40–46 (1942)). 
232. Id. at 144 (emphasis added); see id. at 147 (“[W]here the Board’s chosen remedy 
trenches upon a federal statute or policy outside the Board’s competence to administer, the 
Board’s remedy may be required to yield.”). 
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the NLRA.233  One of the employees, Jose Castro, was an 
undocumented worker, who had initially gained employment with 
Hoffman by offering a friend’s birth certificate to establish his 
eligibility.234  Castro’s use of another person’s documents to obtain 
employment violated the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(“IRCA”), which bars both an employer’s knowing hiring of 
unauthorized aliens and a prospective employee’s use of false 
documents, or the documents of another, to obtain employment.235  
Since “awarding back pay to illegal aliens runs counter to the policies 
underlying IRCA, policies the Board had no authority to enforce or 
administer,”236 the Court held that the “award lies beyond the bounds of 
the Board’s remedial discretion.”237 
Here, the NLRB ruling and the FINRA Rules involve more than 
exercises of “remedial discretion.”  The FINRA Rules are prophylactic 
measures designed to ensure that brokerage customers have the 
opportunity to pursue class action litigation in court (rather than a 
particular remedy should they prove their claim).  Likewise, the NLRB 
ruling clarifies the right of employees to press their claims collectively 
(regardless of the remedy sought), and defines an unfair labor practice.  
Even if these rules and ruling are not remedial in nature, however, they 
may “trench upon” the policies that the Concepcion Court has read into 
the FAA, and their entitlement to deference may be questioned on that 
ground. 
Second and related, where statutes—like the Freedom of Information 
Act or the Administrative Procedures Act—apply to all or most 
administrative agencies, it is “universally agreed that no single agency 
with enforcement power has been charged with administration of these 
statutes, and hence that Chevron does not apply.”238  Since the FAA 
applies broadly and neither the NLRB nor FINRA (nor the SEC) is 
charged with its enforcement, the FINRA Rules and the NLRB ruling 
are not entitled to Chevron deference to the extent they interpret the 
FAA.  Thus, the Board’s conclusion that its decision accommodates the 
 
233. Id. at 140 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)). 
234. Id. at 141. 
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012). 
236. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added). 
237. Id.  See id. at 151 (“[A]llowing the Board to award back pay to illegal aliens would 
unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as 
expressed in IRCA.”). 
238. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 893.  See also Sunstein, supra note 181, at 209 
(“Agencies are not given Chevron deference when they are interpreting the Freedom of 
Information Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and other statutes that cut across a wide 
range of agencies.”). 
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FAA is likely not entitled to Chevron deference because the NLRB is 
not charged with administration of the FAA. 
But even if the NLRB’s or FINRA’s interpretations of the FAA are 
not themselves entitled to Chevron deference, portions of their 
respective ruling and rules may be.  In particular, the portion of the 
NLRB ruling finding that class action waivers violate the NLRA should 
be eligible for deference under Chevron and Mead because the agency 
has authority to adjudicate claims arising under the labor statute.  
Likewise, the FINRA Rules may be eligible for Chevron deference 
because they embody a permissible interpretation of the Securities 
Exchange Act, a statute within the SEC’s purview.  If this much is 
correct, however, a court will still have to decide how to resolve the 
conflict between the NLRA, as interpreted by the NLRB in Horton, or 
the Exchange Act, as interpreted in the FINRA Rules, and the FAA, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Concepcion. 
Here, a third argument comes into play: Chevron deference “does not 
trump prior interpretations of statutes adopted by the Court itself.”239  
Not only has the Supreme Court held that its own interpretations of a 
statute are entitled to stare decisis effect and form the backdrop against 
which agency actions are assessed,240 but the Courts of Appeals have 
declined to defer to agency decisions interpreting Supreme Court 
precedent.241  As the D.C. Circuit explained (in a case involving a 
decision of the Federal Election Commission): 
We are not obliged to defer to an agency’s interpretation of Supreme 
Court precedent under Chevron or any other principle.  The 
Commission’s assertion that Congress and the Court are equivalent in 
 
239. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 839.  See also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 
284, 295 (1996) (“Once we have determined a statute’s meaning, we adhere to our ruling under 
the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against 
that settled law.”) (citations omitted); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 180, at 915 (“The Supreme 
Court has consistently ruled that agency interpretations of statutes that deviate from the Court’s 
own precedents are not entitled to Chevron deference.”); Pierce, Reconciling Chevron, supra note 
181, at 2226 (describing the Supreme Court’s “mechanical rule” that its own “precedents always 
trump the deference owed under Chevron”); id. at 2259–62 (criticizing the Court’s mechanical 
rule and proposing an alternate methodology for reconciling conflicts between Chevron and stare 
decisis); Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis “Exception” to the Chevron Deference Rule, 
44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 726–29 (1992) (proposing an approach for resolving tension between 
Chevron and stare decisis). 
240. Neal, 516 U.S. at 295; Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536–37 (1992).. 
241. See, e.g., NLRB v. U.S. Postal Serv., 660 F.3d 65, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[A] court of 
appeals is ‘not obligated to defer to an agency’s interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent 
under Chevron.’” (citations omitted)); New York New York, LLC v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585, 590 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (repeating the principle that “the Board’s judgment is not entitled to judicial 
deference”); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that 
agency interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is not entitled to deference). 
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this respect is inconsistent with Chevron’s basic premise.  Chevron 
recognized that Congress delegates policymaking functions to 
agencies, so deference by the courts to agencies’ statutory 
interpretations of ambiguous language is appropriate.  But the 
Supreme Court does not, of course, have a similar relationship to 
agencies, and agencies have no special qualifications of legitimacy in 
interpreting Court opinions.  There is therefore no reason for courts—
the supposed experts in analyzing judicial decisions—to defer to 
agency interpretations of the Court’s opinions.242 
Thus, the NLRB’s and FINRA’s interpretations of Concepcion may not 
be entitled to Chevron deference. 
If portions of the NLRB ruling and FINRA Rules (interpreting the 
NLRA and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, respectively) remain 
eligible for Chevron deference, how will the apparent conflict with the 
FAA be resolved and by whom?  Which statute’s policy must give way?  
Neither the NLRB nor FINRA (nor the SEC) has authority to enforce 
the FAA, and their interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Concepcion are not likely entitled to deference.243  Thus, it appears 
likely that the courts (and ultimately the Supreme Court itself) will be 
called upon to resolve this conflict between federal policies.  Given its 
strong pro-arbitration policy, it would not be surprising if the Court 
ultimately concludes that the NLRB ruling and the FINRA Rules 
“trench” upon the pro-arbitration policy that the Court has read into the 
FAA. 
In all events, the class action waiver materials would offer the Legal 
Process students a wonderful opportunity to explore a host of issues 
lying under the surface of Chevron, and to reflect upon the nature of 
administrative agencies, their relationships with both Congress and the 
Court, and their role in the interpretation and development of law. 
III. THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND THE SUPREME COURT 
My Legal Process course not only examined the dynamic 
relationships among Congress, the Supreme Court and administrative 
agencies, but it analyzed the uses of precedent,244 the values of adhering 
to precedent,245 and the reasons for occasionally overruling 
 
242. Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 
11 (1998). 
243. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s reluctance to 
defer to agency decisions that conflict with prior interpretations of statutes by the Court). 
244. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 
72–76 (1960) (differentiating between strict and loose views of precedent). 
245. See, e.g., Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 119, at 1364–67 (citing 
institutional competency, legislative acquiescence and practical reliance as rationales for adhering 
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precedent.246  Because this was a first-semester, first-year course, we 
began with an examination of the judicial system—of parallel state and 
federal court systems, each with appellate courts that review lower court 
decisions.  We assumed that when the Supreme Court announces an 
interpretation of the law, the lower courts follow its decision, whether 
the Court gets it right or not.  As Professors Frank Cross and Emerson 
Tiller asserted, lower courts “are presumed to adhere to the self-
enforcing principle of stare decisis and to apply the doctrines of higher 
courts to the particular facts of the underlying case.”247  As political 
scientist John Gruhl described the hierarchical model over thirty years 
ago, the Supreme Court renders “authoritative decisions” and we 
assume that the lower courts “obey[] the dictates of the Supreme 
Court.”248 
Once the students examined the hierarchical model, we considered 
whether the courts’ respective roles in interpretation and law-making 
might be more complex than the conventional wisdom suggests.  Does 
the actual relationship among the courts differ from the traditional 
hierarchical model, and if so, how? 
A. The Lower Courts as Change Agents 
Professor Hillel Levin suggests that the Supreme Court’s recent 
pleading decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly249 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,250 as well as its earlier summary judgment trilogy,251 confound 
 
to statutory precedents); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) 
(“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity 
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”) (citation omitted). 
246. See, e.g., Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, supra note 119, at 1369–84 
(analyzing procedural laxity, implied delegation of law-making authority by Congress to the 
Court, and lack of reliance as reasons why the Supreme Court occasionally reconsiders its own 
statutory precedents).  See also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 854–55 (“[W]hen this Court 
reexamines a prior holding, . . . we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply 
in defying practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend . 
. . hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether 
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant 
of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to 
have robbed the old rule of significant application or  justification.”). 
247. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2155 (1998). 
248. John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by Lower 
Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 502 (1980).  Gruhl’s study of lower court compliance with 
Supreme Court decisions on libel law supports the hierarchical model: “The Court drastically 
altered doctrine which had remained relatively stable throughout most of the country’s history, 
and it got the lower courts to comply immediately and overwhelmingly.”  Id. at 518–19. 
249. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  
250. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  See also Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of 
Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689, 694 (stating that Iqbal and Twombly cast a “sea of 
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the common wisdom regarding the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and the lower federal courts.252  In both sets of cases, he posits, 
the changes in the law were not initiated by the Supreme Court, but 
rather by the lower courts, which had long been pushing for heightened 
pleading requirements and had been using summary judgment 
“expansively to dismiss apparently meritless cases for quite a long time 
before the Court jumped on the bandwagon.”253  In neither case, Levin 
argues, did the Supreme Court pronounce a bold change in procedural 
law, which the lower courts then meekly followed.254  Levin believes 
that “[a]t most, the Supreme Court has been a lag indicator for what was 
already happening in the lower courts.”255 
Levin generalizes from the summary judgment and pleading 
examples to question whether 
our general view of the relationship between the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts may be backwards.  It is not necessarily, as we tend to 
assume, that if we read Supreme Court opinions we can deduce what 
lower courts will do (under the assumption that they follow 
precedent); rather it is that we can read lower court opinions and 
deduce where the Supreme Court may end up.256 
Thus, Levin presents two competing views of the relationship between 
the Supreme Court and the lower courts.  In the conventional 
hierarchical view, the Supreme Court announces changes in the 
interpretation of the law and the lower courts obediently follow.  In 
Levin’s alternative view, it is the lower courts, motivated by docket 
pressures perhaps, that push for changes in the law and the Supreme 
Court that eventually follows their lead. 
B. The Lower Courts as Brakes on Change 
The class action waiver cases suggest yet a third view of the lower 
courts’ role vis-à-vis the Supreme Court.  Rather than obedient 
followers or catalysts for change, the lower courts are sometimes 
reluctant, even recalcitrant, forces that resist the Supreme Court’s 
 
doubt” around Rule 12(b)(6) motions and caused commentators to “reexamine summary 
judgment in the context of major pleading changes”). 
251. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
252. Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 143, 144–45, 149–52 (2010). 
253. Id. at 150. 
254. Id. at 149. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 152. 
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attempts to change law on an issue.257 
In the years preceding Concepcion, a number of lower courts 
invalidated class action waivers in arbitration clauses on the theory that 
they were unconscionable under state law258 or interfered with the 
enforcement of statutory rights.259  The Supreme Court called both of 
these theories into question in the last year.  In Concepcion, the 
Supreme Court made clear—or attempted to make clear—that class 
action waivers are enforceable notwithstanding state unconscionability 
law because collective action interferes with the FAA objective of 
“‘encourag[ing] efficient and speedy dispute resolution.’”260  In the 
Court’s words, “Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration 
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”261  The Court in Concepcion 
concluded that California’s unconscionability case law is preempted by 
the FAA because it “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”262 
Likewise, in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, decided less than a 
year after Concepcion, the Supreme Court made clear that the FAA 
 
257. Perhaps the most recent notable illustration of a “resistant” court is the Montana Supreme 
Court.  See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011) (upholding a 
Montana law that prohibited independent political expenditures by corporations, notwithstanding 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010)), rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per 
curiam).  See id. at 13 (finding that Montana has a compelling interest in prohibiting certain 
political expenditures).  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed, stating 
that “Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in 
Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”  Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 
2491. 
258. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (“[W]hen the 
[class action] waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes 
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is 
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately 
cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then, at least to the 
extent the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the . . . waivers are unconscionable 
under California law and should not be enforced.”), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
259. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009) (“AmEx 
I”) (“[T]he class action waiver . . . cannot be enforced . . . because to do so would grant Amex de 
facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of 
recovery. . . . [W]e have relied here on a vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of 
the federal substantive law of arbitrability.”), vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
260. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 221 (1985)); see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Concepcion Court’s focus on 
efficiency). 
261. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
262. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
3_WASSERMAN.DOCX 12/14/2012  3:59 PM 
2012] Legal Process in a Box 435 
requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements even when the 
claimants present federal statutory claims, “unless the FAA’s mandate 
has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’”263  Even 
where a federal statute requires companies to inform consumers that 
they “have a right to sue”264 in the event of a statutory violation and 
even where the statute invalidates any waiver by a consumer of any 
protection under the law,265 the Court concluded that a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement is enforceable because the disclosure provision 
creates no right to sue in court.266  Instead, the Court read the “right to 
sue” language in the statute as describing the consumer’s right to 
enforce the law’s requirements, but not necessarily in court.267 
In light of these recent Supreme Court decisions, and applying the 
traditional hierarchical model, one would expect that when employees 
or consumers challenge the enforceability of class action waivers, trial 
courts and intermediate appellate courts would reject unconscionability 
defenses, citing Concepcion, and would be skeptical of arguments 
claiming a statutory right to sue in court or to proceed collectively, in 
light of CompuCredit.  And while most lower courts have followed 
these courses and have upheld class action waivers,268 interestingly, not 
all have.  The following Sections focus on a few decisions that either 
have struck down a class action waiver notwithstanding Concepcion, or 
at least have read the Court’s recent opinions narrowly.  These cases 
suggest that the lower courts do not always obediently follow Supreme 
 
263. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (quoting Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). 
264. Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2012). 
265. Id. § 1679f(a). 
266. CompuCredit Corp., 132 S. Ct. at 669–70. 
267. Id. at 670. 
268. See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1158 & n.2, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(viewing Concepcion as “broadly written”; reading the Court’s “statutory rights” cases as 
“limited to federal statutory rights”; and concluding that “Concepcion controls, [and] the FAA 
preempts the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver”) (emphasis added); 
Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Phil., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Pennsylvania 
law prohibiting class action waivers is surely preempted by the FAA under Concepcion . . . .”) 
(citation omitted).  See also PUBLIC CITIZEN & NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, 
JUSTICE DENIED: ONE YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S 
CONCEPCION DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 4 (April 2012), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf 
(“[Corporations have frequently invoked Concepcion to argue that consumers’ claims should not 
be pursued collectively but, rather, individually.  Courts have usually accepted these 
arguments.”); Sternlight, supra note 73, at 708 (“Most courts are rejecting all potential 
distinctions and are instead applying Concepcion broadly as a ‘get out of class actions free’ 
card.”); Weston, supra note 73, at 115–18 (surveying cases enforcing class action waivers post-
Concepcion). 
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Court precedents, but rather sometimes resist changes in the law by 
reading the Court’s decisions narrowly, drawing fine distinctions or 
otherwise seeking to limit the extent of the change in the law wrought 
by Supreme Court decisions. 
1. State and Federal Courts Invalidate Representative Action Waivers 
in PAGA Cases 
Both state and federal courts in California269 have held that 
Concepcion does not govern representative actions brought under the 
California Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).270  In 
Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., the employment application completed 
by store employees incorporated by reference the company’s arbitration 
policy, which barred any dispute from being “heard or arbitrated on a 
class action basis, as a private attorney general, or on bases involving 
claims or disputes brought in a representative capacity . . . .”271  PAGA 
permits an employee to sue an employer for violations of the state labor 
code “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former 
employees” to recover a civil penalty.272  In PAGA representative 
actions, the named plaintiff acts as a private attorney general.273  The 
primary goal of a PAGA action is not restitution—prevailing employees 
receive only 25% of the recovery274—but rather enforcement of a 
public right that otherwise would be enforced by a state agency.275 
Reading Concepcion narrowly to permit waivers of “the private 
individual right of a consumer to pursue class action remedies in court 
or arbitration,”276 the California Court of Appeals in Brown concluded 
that it did “not provide that a public right, such as that created under the 
PAGA, can be waived if such a waiver is contrary to state law.”277  The 
state court eschewed the unconscionability doctrine (which had been 
preempted in Concepcion), relying instead on the public nature of the 
 
269. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1910 (2012) (discussing PAGA); Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., No. 
2:11-cv-06456-CJC(PJWx), 2011 WL 4595249, at *10–12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011). 
270. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698 et seq. (West 2012). 
271. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 857 (quoting the company’s arbitration policy, which was 
incorporated by reference into the employment application). 
272. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a).  See also Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
539, 555–56 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that PAGA authorizes the recovery of civil penalties on 
behalf of others). 
273. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860.  Standard class action requirements need not be 
satisfied.  Id. (citing Arias v. Super. Ct., 209 P.3d 923, 927 & n.2 (Cal. 2009)). 
274. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i). 
275. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860–62. 
276. Id. at 861 (emphasis added). 
277. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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representative action.  In short, the California state court opined, 
“representative actions under the PAGA do not conflict with the 
purposes of the FAA.  If the FAA preempted state law as to the 
unenforceability of the PAGA representative action waivers, the 
benefits of private attorney general actions to enforce state labor laws 
would, in large part, be nullified.”278  Thus, the court refused to enforce 
the representative action waiver. 
In Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., a federal district court 
in California reached the same result, albeit on a different theory, 
finding that a “PAGA waiver is unconscionable because it both deprives 
the individual of the right to bring a representative action and deprives 
the LWDA [(Labor and Workforce Development Agency)] the benefits 
of the enforcement action brought by aggrieved employees.”279 
2. Federal Appeals Court Invalidates Class Action Waiver                    
in Antitrust Case 
Relying on neither state unconscionability doctrine nor the public 
nature of the right at issue, the Second Circuit invalidated a class action 
waiver in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation because its 
practical effect would have been to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to 
press claims against the American Express Company (“AmEx”) that 
arose under federal antitrust statutes.280  The form agreement between 
the merchants and AmEx contained a mandatory arbitration clause, 
 
278. Id. at 863 (citation omitted).  It remanded the action to the trial court to determine 
whether the waiver provision, waiving the right to pursue a representative action under PAGA, 
should be severed from the rest of the arbitration agreement, or whether the entire arbitration 
agreement should be stricken.  Id. at 864.  In a footnote, the court raised the question whether 
PAGA representative actions might be arbitrable.  Id. at 864 n.9 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)). 
279. Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 2011 WL 4595249, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2011).  
The court acknowledged that a prior decision of the same court had upheld a class 
action/collective action waiver applied to PAGA claims because “the arbitration of a 
representative PAGA action would, like a class claim, require a more cumbersome and costlier 
process in contravention to the streamlined, informal arbitral process envisioned by the FAA, and 
because there is also the increased risk that erroneous decisions on a PAGA claim would go 
uncorrected.”  Id. at *11 (discussing Quevedo v. Macy’s, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142–43 
(C.D. Cal. 2011)). 
280. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (AmEx III), 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), reh’g en 
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., No. 12-133, 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012).  See also Gilles & Friedman, 
supra note 73, at 640–47 (maintaining that the vindication of federal statutory rights doctrine 
survives Concepcion but questioning its real-world impact); David Horton, Arbitration and 
Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 746–67 
(2012) (drawing on inalienability theory to “recalibrate the vindication of rights doctrine”); 
Weston, supra note 73, at 788–91 (citing cases that invoke the need to vindicate federal statutory 
rights). 
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which barred the merchants from participating as either class 
representatives or as members of a class of claimants regarding any 
claims subject to arbitration.281  The Second Circuit invalidated the 
waiver because the plaintiffs had demonstrated that they could not 
vindicate their rights under the Sherman and Clayton antitrust statutes 
through individual arbitrations.282 
The AmEx court invoked a body of Supreme Court case law 
upholding the arbitrability of federal statutory claims “unless Congress 
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies 
for the statutory rights at issue.”283  Noting the Supreme Court’s 
recognition “‘that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude 
a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in 
the arbitral forum,’”284 the Second Circuit placed heavy emphasis on an 
affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs’ expert, establishing that it would be 
so expensive for the plaintiffs to arbitrate their disputes individually that 
they would have to forfeit their rights under the antitrust laws.285  Here, 
because plaintiffs could not afford to pursue their federal antitrust 
claims individually, the court held that the class action waiver was 
unenforceable.  Carefully avoiding a categorical rule,286 the Second 
Circuit declined to hold that class action waivers in antitrust actions are 
per se unenforceable, concluding instead that each waiver must be 
considered on its own merits.287  Because class arbitration cannot be 
ordered in the absence of an agreement,288 the court instructed the 
district court to deny AmEx’s motion to compel arbitration.289 
The Second Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc.290  In her 
opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Pooler 
 
281. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 209. 
282. Id. at 207 n.3, 215–16.  See also Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-
bbc, 2012 WL 1242318, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012) (“[T]he arbitration agreement violates 
the NLRA because it includes a provision that requires [plaintiff] to give up her right under the 
statute to bring claims collectively.”); id. at *6 (deferring to the NLRB’s decision in Horton and 
concluding that Concepcion “is not on point because the class action waiver in that case did not 
conflict with the substantive right of a federal statute”). 
283. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 215 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
284. Id. at 216 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)). 
285. Id. at 217–18. 
286. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing how lower courts read Concepcion narrowly as 
precluding only categorical rules). 
287. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 219. 
288. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding 
that parties that are silent on the issue of class-wide arbitration “cannot be compelled to submit 
their dispute to class arbitration”); supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Stolt-Nielsen). 
289. AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 219. 
290. In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig. (AmEx IV), 681 F.3d 139, 139 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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(who authored the panel opinion in AmEx) emphasized that the case was 
not governed by Concepcion, which focused on preemption of state 
laws hostile to arbitration.291  Rather, the Second Circuit’s analysis in 
AmEx “rests squarely on a vindication of statutory rights analysis—an 
issue untouched in Concepcion.”292 
3. Lower Courts Read Concepcion Narrowly to                          
Preclude Categorical Rules 
Lower courts have sought to preserve the right to sue collectively, not 
only to promote public rights (under PAGA) and federal statutory rights 
(under the federal antitrust laws), but also to preserve a right to bring a 
class action (notwithstanding a contractual waiver) by reading 
Concepcion narrowly to preclude only categorical rules that ban class 
action waivers.293  This Section focuses on a federal district court 
opinion in Coiro v. Wachovia Bank to illustrate this approach. 
In a putative class action filed in federal district court in New Jersey, 
the plaintiff challenged on unconscionability grounds a class action 
waiver in an arbitration clause in a bank’s Deposit Agreement.294  The 
court in Coiro declined to read Concepcion as rendering class action 
waivers per se enforceable.295  Instead, it read Concepcion narrowly to 
bar only categorical rules that invalidate such waivers, and concluded 
that “Concepcion does not control this case.”296  Having declined to 
read Concepcion as demanding the enforcement of all class action 
waivers, the court further concluded that it had to perform a “fact-
sensitive analysis” to determine whether the particular class action 
waiver at issue was unconscionable under New Jersey law.297 
To support its narrow reading of Concepcion, the court invoked a 
 
291. Id. (Pooler, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 140 (“While Concepcion addresses state 
contract rights, Amex III deals with federal statutory rights—a significant distinction.”). 
292. Id. at 139. 
293. See, e.g., Valentine v. WideOpen W. Fin. LLC, No. 09-C-07653, 2012 WL 1021809, at 
*5–6 (N.D. Ill. March 26, 2012) (declining to read Concepcion as foreclosing challenges to 
arbitration agreements or class action waivers on state law unconscionability grounds); Brewer v. 
Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 491–92 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (stating that “the Supreme 
Court’s preemption of [the categorical rule in] Discover Bank does not preempt all state law 
defenses to contract formation,” and that “Concepcion permits state courts to apply state law 
defenses to the formation of the particular contract at issue on a case-by-case basis”); Coiro v. 
Wachovia Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 11-3597, 2012 WL 628514, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012) (“The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Concepcion made clear that categorical rules do not appropriately fit 
within [section two’s] savings clause . . . .  Concepcion does not control this case.”).   
294. Coiro, 2012 WL 628514, at *1–2. 
295. Id. at *4 (citing AmEx III, 667 F.3d at 212). 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at *4–5. 
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February 2012 United States Supreme Court decision, Marmet Health 
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown.298  Marmet vacated a decision of the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which had held “unenforceable all 
predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal 
injury or wrongful death against nursing homes.”299 
In concluding that the FAA preempted West Virginia’s policy against 
compelled arbitration of personal injury and wrongful death claims 
against nursing homes, the United States Supreme Court in Marmet held 
that “West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to 
arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing 
homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of 
claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the 
FAA.”300  As the district court in Coiro saw it, the Supreme Court in 
Marmet remained open to the state court’s alternative ruling that the 
particular arbitration clause was unconscionable and remanded to the 
West Virginia court to “consider whether, absent [the state’s categorical 
policy], the arbitration clauses [here] are unenforceable under state 
common law principles that are not specific to arbitration and pre-
empted by the FAA.”301  Thus, the district court in Coiro relied on 
Marmet to reinforce its conclusion that Concepcion does not bar a fact-
intensive analysis of the unconscionability vel non under state law of a 
class action waiver.302 
4. Placing the Lower Court Decisions within a                           
Broader Theoretical Context 
That some lower courts have resisted Concepcion and CompuCredit, 
or at least have read them narrowly, should not come as a surprise.  
After all, more than sixty years ago the late Professor Karl Llewellyn 
wrote that “there is no single right and accurate way of reading one 
case, or of reading a bunch of cases.”303  In his famous collection of 
 
298. 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam).  The district court in Coiro mistakenly refers to the 
Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care as “Allen v. Lasalle Bank, N.A.”  Coiro, 2012 WL 
628514, at *4. 
299. Marmet Health Care, 132 S. Ct. at 1202 (describing the opinion below, Brown ex rel. 
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011)). 
300. Id. at 1203–04 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
301. Id. at 1204. 
302. Coiro, 2012 WL 628514, at *4.  After performing a fact-sensitive analysis under New 
Jersey unconscionability law, the court concluded that the waiver at issue was neither 
unconscionable nor otherwise unenforceable.  Id. at *4–7 (noting that plaintiff could recover 
treble damages and citing a lack of evidence regarding the prohibitive cost of litigating the case). 
303. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (1950). 
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lectures, The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn noted that courts observing a 
“strict” view of precedent employ “the recognized, legitimate, 
honorable technique for whittling precedents away, for making . . . the 
court, in its decision, free of them.  It is a surgeon’s knife.”304  Applying 
this “knife,” judges can read prior opinions narrowly, limiting “the 
picture of what was actually before the court and . . . hold[ing] that the 
ruling made requires to be understood as thus restricted.”305  While 
Llewellyn was not speaking specifically about the means by which 
lower courts can “free” themselves of unwelcome Supreme Court 
precedents, the class action waiver cases demonstrate that lower courts 
can (and have) employ(ed) this technique to put the brakes on even a 
fast-moving train like Concepcion. 
Political scientists and other scholars have sought to explain why 
lower courts decline to follow, or read narrowly, certain Supreme Court 
precedents.  Perhaps most obviously, lower court judges may have 
“personal or partisan policy preferences” that conflict with Supreme 
Court decisions.306  For example, an N.Y.U. Law Review Note 
published in 1984, which found that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit had the lowest affirmance rate of all of the courts of 
appeals,307 concluded that “the most obvious explanation—that the 
Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit are ideologically incompatible—
completely accounts for the low affirmance rate.”308  A 1998 study by 
Professors Cross and Tiller published in the Yale Law Journal also 
found that “there is a significant political determinant to judicial 
decisionmaking.”309  This explanation is consistent with the attitudinal 
model for Supreme Court decision-making, which posits that the 
Justices themselves decide disputes in light of their own “ideological 
 
304. LLEWELLYN, supra note 244, at 73. 
305. Id. at 72. 
306. Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2156.  See also Roy W. McLeese III, Note, 
Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its 
Implications for a National Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1048 (1984) (citing 
ideological differences between the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court). 
307. McLeese, supra note 306, at 1048–50 (examining the 1980–1983 Terms and finding that 
the average affirmance rate for the other courts of appeals was 39.2%, while the D.C. Circuit’s 
affirmance rate was only 10.4%). 
308. Id. at 1048.  See also id. at 1050–60 (examining three areas of ideological disagreement: 
the costs and benefits of federal judicial supervision; the importance of judicial protection of 
federal governmental interests; and the importance of judicial protection of individual interests); 
id. at 1060–73 (considering but rejecting alternative explanations for the D.C. Circuit’s 
particularly low affirmance rate); Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2159 (“In those cases in 
which [Supreme Court] doctrine does not support the partisan or ideological policy preferences of 
the court majority, we expect somewhat more disobedience.”). 
309. Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2169. 
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attitudes and values.”310 
If lower court judges are influenced by their political beliefs, why do 
they ever adhere to Supreme Court precedents with which they 
disagree?  The most obvious explanation is “a sense of responsibility or 
role orientation.”311  As Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit 
explained, “it is the law—and not the personal politics of individual 
judges—that controls judicial decision-making in most cases resolved 
by the court of appeals.”312  This explanation comports with the legal 
model for Supreme Court decision-making, which posits that the 
Justices themselves (like lower court judges) decide cases based upon 
the plain meaning of the statute or constitutional provision at issue, the 
intent of the Framers, and prior precedents, rather than on their own 
personal political or ideological beliefs.313 
 Alternatively, lower courts may follow precedents because they fear 
reversal by the Supreme Court.314  But when the likelihood of appellate 
review is low, judges on the courts of appeals may be less inclined to 
follow Supreme Court precedents at odds with their policy preferences. 
Scholars have invoked principal-agent theory to explain this dynamic, 
casting the federal courts of appeals as agents of the Supreme Court.315  
 
310. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002).  See also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal 
Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–79 
(1996) (describing the attitudinal model). 
311. Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2157; see also id. at 2158 (positing that lower courts 
may comply with Supreme Court precedents because they “are dutifully performing their roles as 
sincere jurists, applying the principles in an ideologically (or politically) neutral manner”) 
(footnote omitted). 
312. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: 
Dispelling Some Myths about the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620 (1985). 
313. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 310, at 48–49.  See Cross, supra note 310, at 255–63 
(describing the traditional legal model). 
314. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2158 (“[T]he lower courts fear exposure of any 
noncompliance and consequent reversal.”); McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive 
Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1644 (1995) 
(assuming that lower courts are “rational optimizers,” and will “not necessarily pick their 
preferred decision” if they anticipate that the Court will agree to review and then reverse their 
decision). 
315. See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 55, 76 (2008) (“By considering the role of the Supreme Court in the judicial hierarchy and 
its power to review decisions from the courts of appeals, I have presented considerable evidence 
that the judicial hierarchy operates within the context of a principal-agent relationship.”); Donald 
R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-
Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 675 (1994) (applying principal-agent theory 
to the judicial hierarchy); cf. Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the 
Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 538 (2011) (“[T]he interaction between the 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts might be more productively modeled as a type of 
mixed-motive coordination game rather than a traditional principal-agent relationship.”). 
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“If the circuit courts consisted of faithful agents, they would obediently 
follow the policy dictates set down by the Supreme Court.  But utility 
maximizing appeals court judges also have their own policy 
preferences, which they may seek to follow to the extent possible.”316  
The Supreme Court cannot monitor the courts of appeals effectively 
because it only learns of those courts of appeals decisions that are 
appealed and it lacks the resources to review all of them.317  Thus, there 
is an opportunity for lower court judges to shirk their responsibility to 
the Court and to advance their own policy preferences. 
But lower court judges are monitored not only by the Supreme Court 
itself, but also by litigants, who may appeal if the lower courts engage 
in flagrant shirking,318 and by fellow members of the appellate court 
panel, whose monitoring prevents the majority from manipulating or 
disregarding Supreme Court precedent.319  Cross and Tiller refer to 
these fellow circuit judges as “whistleblowers.”320 
One study of courts of appeals’ compliance with, and responsiveness 
to, Supreme Court case law on search and seizure concluded that lower 
court judges “appear to be relatively faithful agents of their principal, 
the Supreme Court,”321 but nevertheless pursued their own policy 
preferences and frequently had “room to maneuver.”322  The 
researchers, Professors Songer, Segal and Cameron, found that “the 
appeals court judges were able to shirk, thereby partially advancing 
their own policy preferences, by interpretations of Supreme Court 
doctrine in ambiguous situations that were not directly 
noncompliant.”323 
The Supreme Court recently granted AmEx’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari324 and will soon have an opportunity to review the Second 
Circuit’s opinion, which invalidated a class action waiver 
notwithstanding Concepcion and CompuCredit.  While the Court 
declined to grant certiorari in the Brown case,325  it may ultimately 
review some or all of the theories advanced in Brown, Urbino, and 
Coiro.  In the meantime, these cases provide a rich opportunity to 
 
316. Songer et al., supra note 315, at 675. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 693. 
319. Cross & Tiller, supra note 247, at 2156. 
320. Id. at 2156, 2159. 
321. Songer, supra note 315, at 690. 
322. Id. at 692–93. 
323. Id. at 693. 
324. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12-133, 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. Nov. 9, 
2012). 
325. Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1910 (2012). 
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debate whether the lower courts’ readings of Concepcion and 
CompuCredit were careful and appropriate or unduly narrow and 
cramped, and to consider different models for judicial decision-making 
and monitoring. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion advanced an agenda 
found in neither the text nor the legislative history of the FAA.     
Concepcion therefore invites a close examination of the relationship 
between law and politics, as well as the role of legislative history in 
statutory interpretation.  Moreover, reactions to the Court’s decision by 
Congress, federal administrative agencies, and lower courts raise a host 
of provocative questions about the relationships among the branches of 
government, and between the Supreme Court and the lower courts.  In 
particular, these reactions provoke us to rethink the meaning of 
legislative primacy, the influence of federal agencies on the 
development of the law, and competing conceptions of the relationship 
between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. 
 
